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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters, all of which make extensive use of Italian ad-
ministrative data. The first chapter studies strategic delays in the timing of layoffs
around an age-at-layoff threshold entitling workers to a four month increase in potential
unemployment insurance (UI) benefit duration. After having documented sizeable
manipulation of age at layoff near the threshold, we show that the ensuing increase
in UI benefit receipt is 81% mechanically due to higher coverage and only 19% the
result of moral hazard responses. The second chapter documents the effects of increased
import competition from China on the Italian labour market. In the first part of the
paper, we show that areas that were initially specialized in import-competing industries
suffered larger losses in manufacturing employment. However, these effects are modest
in size. In the second part of the paper, we show that incumbent manufacturing workers
did not suffer long-term economic losses. Although they spent less time at their initial
employers, they were able to carry out successful transitions towards other sectors,
in areas with better job opportunities. The third chapter studies the labour market
outcomes of individuals starting an apprenticeship and compares them with those of
similar individuals starting temporary contracts that, at least formally, do not provide
training. I show that while apprenticeships increase the probability of conversion to
open-ended contracts, especially at the initial firm, they also decrease the probability
of obtaining further temporary contracts. Quantitatively, this second effect prevails,
generating a negative effect on the probability of obtaining any job.
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Chapter 1
Happy Birthday? Manipulation and Selection
in Unemployment Insurance
Luca Citino
Bank of Italy and London School of Economics
Kilian Russ
Bonn Graduate School of Economics
Vincenzo Scrutinio
University of Bologna
Abstract
This paper documents strategic delays in the timing of layoffs around an age-at-layoff threshold
entitling workers to a four months increase in potential unemployment insurance (UI) benefit
duration in Italy. Manipulation is quantitatively important with over 15% of layoffs in the six
weeks before workers’ fiftieth birthday being delayed. Using bunching techniques we estimate
that the average manipulator collects an additional 2,339 Euros or 38,5% more in UI benefits.
This substantial increase in UI benefit receipt is to 81% mechanically due to higher coverage
and only 19% the result of moral hazard. Manipulators’ implied responsiveness to additional UI
coverage is modest and, in particular, not higher than for the average fifty-year-old, mitigating
concerns about anticipated moral hazard as the main motive for manipulation. Contrary,
we provide evidence that manipulators are highly selected on long-term nonemployment risk.
Manipulation is most prevalent among female, white-collar, part-time workers at small firms
suggesting adjustment costs and proximity to superiors may play a role in workers’ ability to
delay their layoff. Together, these findings illustrate how a more comprehensive understanding
of the underlying motives for manipulation might influence how it is perceived.
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1.1 Introduction
The targeting of public policies on the basis of observable individual characteristics is ubiquitous
in OECD countries. Governments tax individuals based on their marital status, provide welfare
payments which depend on the number of children in the household, or tie disability insurance
to particular medical conditions. The theoretical desirability for targeting based on immutable
tags has long been recognized (Akerlof [1978]). In practice however, policy makers often rely on
imperfect tags, which leave room for strategic manipulation and selection into benefit schemes.
How should we view such manipulation? Typically the initial inclination is to regard manipulation
solely as opportunistic behavior. Undeserving individuals cheat their way to higher benefits
and thrive at the expense of others. While manipulation undeniably increases public spending,
this judgment lacks a more comprehensive understanding about the underlying motivation for
manipulation. Perhaps, individuals who decide to manipulate value the additional benefits
tremendously or they manipulate out of desperation. Manipulators might also be relatively less
responsive to benefits once they qualify for them. The underlying rationale and subsequent
changes in behavior are important to better understand manipulation and might ultimately
shape the way the phenomenon is perceived by policy makers and society at large.
While quantifying additional expenditures is relatively straightforward, providing a comprehens-
ive analysis of the motivation for manipulation is considerably more challenging. Our paper
makes progress on this important question by studying a context in which differentiated policies
and manipulation are widespread, namely unemployment insurance (UI) (see Spinnewijn [2019]
for a survey, and Doornik et al. [2018] and Khoury [2018] for recent evidence of manipulation).
We study the Italian UI scheme which until 2015 featured a discontinuous jump in potential
benefit duration (PBD) depending upon whether the worker was laid off before or after her
fiftieth birthday. Individuals separating before age fifty were entitled to eight months of UI,
while those separating afterwards were entitled to twelve months of UI.1
We start by providing clear graphical evidence of manipulation in the form of systematic delays
in the exact timing of layoffs around the age-at-layoff threshold. Using bunching techniques
we estimate that over 15% of all layoffs within six weeks before workers’ fiftieth birthday are
strategically delayed. Over the subsequent nonemployment spell affected workers collect on
average 2,239 Euros each, which corresponds to a 38,5% increase over their baseline UI benefit
receipt.
While the above numbers are large, it is important to keep in mind that manipulation provides
1Similar policies are or have been in place in several OECD countries, such as Germany, Austria
among others.
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individuals with additional UI coverage. Even without a change in subsequent job search
effort, manipulators would still collect additional UI benefits due to the extended coverage
from month eight to twelve. To see this point, consider two extreme cases . First, suppose
manipulators are individuals who would have found a job exactly after eight months, but are
now staying nonemployed for four additional months before taking up their next job. In this
case manipulation is motivated by an anticipated moral hazard response. The four additional
months of benefits are paid only because individuals change their job search effort. Contrary,
suppose manipulators are unemployed for at least twelve months with or without additional UI
coverage. In this case, they would also collect four additional months of UI benefits. However,
in the latter case, it is individuals’ long-term nonemployment risk that drives selection into
manipulation. The additional benefits are paid mechanically due to higher coverage. In reality
manipulation is likely motivated by a combination of these forces, but it becomes clear that
distinguishing between the two leads to very different positive views about manipulation.
Our survival analysis reveals that approximately 81% of the increase in UI benefit receipt is
mechanically due to higher coverage, while the remaining 19% are the result of decreases in
job search effort. Put differently, for one euro of mechanical UI transfer the government pays
an additional 24 cents due to behavioral responses. Interestingly, we find virtually the same
result when studying non-manipulators, i.e. individuals who were laid off just before their
fiftieth birthday. This implies that manipulators are not adversely selected on their efficiency
cost, which may mitigate concerns about anticipated moral hazard being the prime motive for
selection into manipulation. Contrary, we document that manipulators are highly selected on
long-term nonemployment risk. Even absent manipulation, manipulators would have exhausted
eight months of UI benefits with 16.8 p.p. higher probability than non-manipulators.
To shed light on the underlying collusion behavior by which firms and workers agree to postpone
the exact date of layoff, we provide evidence by comparing manipulators and non-manipulators
based on observable characteristics. Some degree of manipulation is pervasive among all
permanent contract workers in private sector firms, with the exception of large firms with
more than fifty employees.2 Manipulation is relatively more prevalent among female, part-time,
white-collar workers at small firms. This suggests that lower adjustment costs, and closer
proximity between workers and their supervisors may facilitate manipulation.
Together our results document widespread manipulation in unemployment insurance and identify
long-term nonemployment risk as an important motive to engage in manipulation. These findings
highlight the importance of studying the underlying motives for manipulation and might influence
how manipulation is perceived. Our analysis also implies that the type of manipulation we
2We find no evidence of manipulation in public sector firms or among temporary contracts.
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consider has only modest effects on economic efficiency, a conclusion that would not hold if
anticipated moral hazard were a prime motive for manipulation. This in turn has implications
for the design of optimal differentiated UI policies.3
Our work relates to several strands of the literature. A large body of work studies the disincentives
effect and the effect on post-reemployment outcomes, such as wages, of UI, exploiting similar
policy variation, see e.g. Card et al. [2007], Rosolia and Sestito [2012], Schmieder et al. [2012],
Landais [2015], Nekoei and Weber [2017], Johnston and Mas [2018] among others. Contrary
to our setting, these papers rely on the absence of manipulation to identify the treatment
effects of interest, whereas we study the effect of manipulation in a setting where it does occur.
Furthermore, while most previous studies of UI focus on the distortion of job search efforts of
the unemployed, we examine strategic behavior at the point of layoff. Our work closely relates
to two recent contributions by Doornik et al. [2018] and Khoury [2018] who exploit manipulation
in UI systems around an eligibility and seniority threshold in Brazil and France, respectively.
Doornik et al. [2018] provide evidence of strategic collusion between workers and firms who time
layoffs to coincide with workers’ eligibility for UI benefits in Brazil. Khoury [2018] exploits a
discontinuity in benefit levels for workers laid off for economic reasons and estimates an elasticity
of employment spell duration with respect to UI benefits of 0.014. Due to the nature of their
policy variation neither of these papers studies the selection patterns we analyze in our work.
From a methodological perspective our work is most closely related to the work by Diamond and
Persson [2017], who study manipulation in Swedish high-stakes exams. The construction of the
manipulation region and of the counterfactual density relies on standard bunching techniques,
such as Saez [2010], Chetty et al. [2011] and Kleven and Waseem [2013].
Although the contribution of the paper is empirical, we do relate to the literature on the
theoretical desirability of tagging (Akerlof [1978]) and ordeals (Nichols and Zeckhauser [1982]).
We show that the bargaining over the exact timing of layoffs between workers and firms serves
as a screening mechanism for long-term nonemployment risk. In recent work Michelacci and
Ruffo [2015] argue for higher UI benefits for young workers by analyzing the canonical Baily
[1978]-Chetty [2006] trade-off from a life-cycle perspective. Age as an useful tag for redistribution
has also been studied in the context of taxation by e.g. Weinzierl [2011] and Best and Kleven
[2013].
The fact that we find substantial manipulation and positive selection on long-term nonemployment
risk also speaks to a recent literature studying the role of private information and adverse selection
3Strictly speaking, manipulation itself already entails a behavioral response. Under the view that
any UI after the eighth month of unemployment to individuals who should have been laid off before
their fiftieth birthday, have zero social value, one could trivially conclude that all additional benefit
payments constitute a loss of social welfare. We do not provide any evidence for or against this view in
our work. However, such extreme welfare criteria are unlikely to be relevant in practice.
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in unemployment insurance, see e.g. Hendren [2017] and Landais et al. [2017]. This literature
studies the role of private information about job loss risk in shaping the market for UI. Our
results indicate that individuals hold information about their expected duration of unemployment
at the point of layoff. Understanding to what degree this information is held privately is beyond
the scope of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the institutional
setting and describes the data; Section 1.3 describes our quantities of interest and presents our
identification strategy; Section 1.4 explains how we implement the latter in practice; Sections 1.5
and 1.6 report the results of our empirical analysis and robustness checks; Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Setting and Data
1.2.1 Institutional setting
This paper studies manipulation in Italy’s Ordinary Unemployment Benefits (OUB) scheme.4
The OUB was in effect from the late 1930s until its abolishment and replacement in January
2013.5 OUB covered all private non-farm and public sector employees who lost their job either
due to the termination of their temporary contract or due to an involuntary termination or
quit for just cause, such as unpaid wages or harassment. Other types of voluntary quits, the
self-employed and the dependent self-employed were not eligible for OUB.6 To qualify for OUB
workers additionally needed to have some labor market attachment. Concretely, workers needed
to have started their first job spell at least two years before the date of layoff, and to have
worked for at least 52 weeks in the previous two years.
Benefit levels were based on the average monthly wage over the three months preceding the
layoff, but the replacement rate was declining over the unemployment spell: 60% of the average
wage for the first six months; 50% for the following two months and 40% for any remaining
period. OUB did not involve any form of experience rating.
Potential benefit duration (PBD) under OUB was a sole function of age at layoff and amounted
to eight months if the layoff preceded the worker’s fiftieth birthday and twelve months if it was
thereafter. This discontinuous change (notch) in coverage created a strong incentive for workers
to delay their date of layoff to fall after their fiftieth birthday.
4Indennità di Disoccupazione Ordinaria a Requisiti Normali in Italian.
5OUB was introduced through Regio Decreto 14th in April 1939.
6For convenience, in the rest of the paper we will use the term “layoff” to indicate all job terminations
that are eligible for claiming UI.
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Two other UI benefit schemes were in place in Italy at the same time of our analysis: Reduced
Unemployment Benefits (RUB) and Mobility Indemnity (MI). However, neither one is likely
to interfere with our analysis due to different eligibility conditions and less generous benefit
coverage. For completeness, we present the two other UI schemes in Appendix 1.A.
1.2.2 Data
We use confidential administrative data from the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS) on the
universe of UI claims in Italy between 2009 and 2012 and combine them with matched employer-
employee records covering the universe of working careers in the private sector. Information on
UI claims comes from the SIP database, which collects data on all income support measures
administered by INPS as a consequence of job separation.7 For every claim we observe the UI
benefit scheme type, its starting date, duration and amount paid. We further observe information
related to the job and the firm. This includes details about the type of the contract and a broad
occupation category.
The SIP database does not contain the date of re-employment after receiving UI benefits. We
therefore retrieve this information from the matched employer-employee database (UNIEMENS)
and construct nonemployment durations as the time difference between the layoff date in the SIP
and the first re-employment in UNIEMENS.8 The UNIEMENS provides additional information
on workers’ careers in the private sector including detailed information on wages and the type
of contract. We observe individuals in the UNIEMENS until 2016, which gives us at least four
years of observations for all workers and we therefore censor all nonemployment durations at
four years.
For our main sample we restrict attention to individuals who lost their job between February
2009 and December 2012, were between 46 and 54 years of age at the time of layoff, and
claimed OUB. Unfortunately, our data does not cover the years prior to February 2009 and the
introduction of a new UI scheme in January 2013 prevents us from including later years. We
further restrict attention to individuals who separate from an employer in the private sector
after a permanent contract. The motivation for this is twofold. First, we show in Section
1.5.5 that manipulation is confined to permanent contract private sector work arrangements.
Second, the UNIEMENS database does not contain job information for public sector jobs, which
means we have no information about the previous work arrangement, nor would we observe
re-employment. At this point, one might be worried that we are missing some re-employment
7Sistema Informativo Percettori in Italian.
8We restrict the latter to be later than the former, which excludes a few short-term jobs that are
compatible with the continuation of UI benefit receipt.
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events, namely, those into public sector jobs. This in unlikely to affect our results because
transitions from private into public sector jobs are rare for workers at such late stage in their
careers. We replicated the analysis for a subsample of individuals for whom we have information
on the full contribution history and results are qualitatively similar. After the exclusion of a
few observations with missing key information we are left with 249,581 separation episodes that
lead to UI claims.
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for our main sample. The average worker receives UI
benefits for about 30 weeks (6.9 months) corresponding to roughly one third of the 90 weeks
(21 months) average nonemployment duration. An average of 50% and 39% of workers are still
nonemployed after eight and twelve months, respectively, implying substantial exhaustion risk.
Our sample of workers is predominately male, on full time contracts, and employed in blue
collar jobs. Workers have spent about 27.5 years in the labor market since their first job and
almost 6 years in their last firm. In terms of geographic distribution, 46% of workers are laid
off in the south or the islands.9 Workers earned about 70 Euro per day which is equivalent to
70× 26 = 1820 Euro per month if working full time. 10 The separating firm is relatively old
(14 years) and large (28.16 employees), but this is driven by a few very large firms. Indeed,
more than 60% of workers come from firms with less than 15 employees while only 18% come
from firms with more than 50 employees. Because our main sample contains workers in their
late forties and early fifties, one might be concerned that transitions into retirement play an
important role. However, this is not the case with only about 1,500 or 0.6% of workers in our
sample claiming retirement benefits before the end of our observation window.11 We now turn
to a description of our objects of interest, which precedes our identification strategy
1.3 Conceptual framework
1.3.1 The moral hazard cost of extended UI coverage
Manipulation provides individuals with additional UI coverage. As in any insurance context the
increase in coverage might cause individuals to change their behavior by reducing the incentive
to avoid adverse states of the world. This change in behavior, in our context a reduction in job
search intensity, constitutes a classical moral hazard response. From an efficiency perspective
9This area encompasses the following regions: Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Molise, Puglia, Sardinia
and Sicilia.
10This information is consistent with the monthly wage reported in our second data source, the SIP
database, which reports an average monthly wage of 1,735 euros in the three months preceding the
layoff.
11For these workers we define the nonemployment spell as the period between the end of the previous
employment and the date at which they claim their pension.
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it is crucial to understand how much of the increase in total insurance payments is driven
by changes in behavior and how much is mechanically due to higher coverage. We consider
distinguishing between these two effects as one of this paper’s main contributions. Quantifying
the relative importance of these effects also leads to potentially different positive views about
manipulation and the motivation behind it, which in turn might shape how the phenomenon is
perceived both by policy makers and society at large.
In the following we formalize the above line of reasoning and introduce the relevant quantities
of interest. It is constructive to decompose the increase in insurance payments, i.e. UI benefit
receipt, under the twelve and eight months scheme as follows:
∆B = B12 −B8 =
∫ 12
0
bt · S12t dt−
∫ 8
0
bt · S8t dt
=
∫ 12
0
bt · (S12t − S8t ) dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
behavioral response (∆BMH)
+
∫ 12
8
bt · S8t dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
mechanical effect (∆BME)
, (1.1)
where B and S denote the average benefit receipt and the survival probability each under the
twelve and eight months PBD scheme, respectively, and bt is the benefit amount in period t.
The behavioral moral hazard response, ∆BMH , captures the part of the benefit receipt increase
that is paid due to the outward shift of the survival curve. The mechanical effect, ∆BME ,
corresponds to the remaining increase in benefit receipt that occurs even absent any behavioral
response and is uniquely due to the additional UI coverage in months eight to twelve. Figure 1.1
illustrates decomposition (1.1) graphically by plotting hypothetical nonemployment survival
rates under the eight and twelve months PBD scheme, under the simplifying assumption of
a constant benefit level. The total increase in benefit receipt corresponds to the sum of the
behavioral/moral hazard effect (dark gray area) and mechanical effect (light gray area).
While the above quantities capture how manipulators respond to extended UI coverage, they are
difficult to compare across groups of individuals, such as manipulators and non-manipulators,
or to relate to empirical evidence from other studies. In order to facilitate such cross-group
comparisons and summarize the extent of moral hazard in one statistic we follow Schmieder and
von Wachter [2017] who suggest normalizing the behavioral response by the mechanical effect.
Concretely, we take the ratio of the behavioral and mechanical cost to the government:
BC
MC
= ∆B
MH
∆BME . (1.2)
The BC/MC ratio measures by how many additional euros benefit receipt increases for each
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euro of mechanical increase. Put differently, if the government transfers one additional euro
of mechanical UI transfers it ends up paying a total of 1 + BCMC in additional UI benefits. Two
things are worth noticing: first, given that the replacement rate is decreasing over the spell,
behavioral changes earlier in the non employment spell generate larger fiscal externalities than
comparable behavioral changes later in the spell. Secondly, as long as bt is a time-varying
fraction of (pre-determined) previous earnings, BC/MC ratios are independent of such earnings.
The statutory replacement rate is therefore the only piece of information needed.
The analysis thus far focused on additional benefit payments and abstracted from the second
source of cost to the government: the loss in tax revenues due to longer nonemployment durations.
Contrary to the analysis of UI benefit receipt, longer nonemployment durations do not entail a
mechanical effect and are solely the result of a behavioral response. Formally, we have:
∆N = N12 −N8 =
∫ ∞
0
bt · S12t dt−
∫ ∞
0
bt · S8t dt =
∫ ∞
0
bt · (S12t − S8t )dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
behavioral response (∆NMH)
(1.3)
where, as above, N and S denote the average nonemployment duration and the survival rate
each under the twelve and eight months PBD scheme, respectively. Since all of the increase in
nonemployment duration constitutes a moral hazard response, we add the resulting cost to the
behavioral cost and adjust formula 1.2 as follows:
BC
MC
τ
= ∆B
MH + τ ·∆NMH
∆BME , (1.4)
where τ is the statutory tax rate that balances the budget of the UI system. We do not take a
stance on what the appropriate tax rate in this context is, but follow Schmieder and Von Wachter
[2016] and use a 3% UI tax.12
1.3.2 Identification strategy
This section provides a self-contained sketch of our estimation strategy and explains the sources
of variation in the data that are used to pin down parameters of interest. The main idea is
to exploit the local nature of manipulation by extrapolating outcomes from regions that are
unaffected by manipulation to learn about what would have happened in the manipulation region
in the absence of it. We first assess the range of the manipulation region with standard bunching
techniques. We then fit polynomials to the unmanipulated part of the data and interpolate to
construct a counterfactual layoff frequency and recover the number and share of manipulators.
12Results are very similar when considering other tax rates.
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Similarly, we construct counterfactuals of outcomes that are not directly manipulated, such
as subsequent benefit receipt or nonemployment survival probabilities, to learn whether these
outcomes respond to manipulation. Intuitively, any unusual change in these outcomes near
the cutoff together with an estimate of how many manipulators are causing it, let us recover
manipulators’ responses. Under minimal additional assumptions, estimates of the response
for the average individual combined with the share of individuals who are manipulators let us
recover the responses of non-manipulators, whom we use to benchmark manipulators’ responses.
We also illustrate how we can use part of the procedure just described to study selection into
manipulation. Our approach is closely related to that of Diamond and Persson [2017]. In the
remainder of this section we lay out our approach in more detail.
Quantifying manipulation: Consider a hypothetical manipulated layoff density as in Figure
1.2a. Absent any manipulation we would expect the frequency of layoffs to be smooth in the
neighborhood of the cutoff. Manipulation instead causes a sharp drop in the number or layoffs
right before and a spike right after age fifty. As in standard bunching techniques, we recover
the counterfactual frequency of layoffs by fitting a polynomial to the unmanipulated parts of
the data (on the left and right of the cutoff) and interpolate inwards. We determine the lower
bound of the missing region by visual inspection, and then iteratively try different upper bounds
of the excess region until we are able to balance the missing and excess mass. The difference
between the observed frequency and the fitted counterfactual lets us recover missing and excess
shares, as well as the number of manipulators in each bin of the missing and excess regions. This
estimation strategy assumes that manipulation takes the form of a pure re-timing of layoffs that
would have occurred anyways. One concern is that the increase in PBD at the age threshold
leads to extensive margin effects [Jäger et al., 2018]. We provide evidence that this is not the
case in our setting in Section 1.6.2.
Effects of manipulation: Equipped with a measure of how many manipulators there are, we
then study outcomes which are not directly manipulated but potentially affected by it. Figure
1.2b illustrates the idea for one of our outcomes of interest: nonemployment survival rates.
Manipulation provides workers with additional UI coverage from month eight to twelve. Thus,
it is likely that nonemployment survival rates respond to the increase in coverage. Consider
a hypothetical statistical relationship between nonemployment survival and age at layoff, as
in Figure 1.2b. In order to estimate how manipulators’ survival rate responds, we take the
difference between two quantities: manipulators’ actual survival probability and manipulators’
counterfactual survival probability had they not been able to manipulate. As illustrated in Figure
1.2b, we obtain these quantities by separately studying the missing and excess region. First, we
fit a flexible counterfactual on the right side of the threshold and estimate the difference between
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the observed and predicted survival rates to assess manipulators’ actual survival probability.
Intuitively, survival rates in the excess region are higher than predicted by the un-manipulated
region to the right only due to manipulation. The extent to which observed and predicted
nonemployment survival rates differ, together with an estimate of how many manipulators are
causing this difference, let us recover manipulators’ actual nonemployment survival probability.
We use analogous arguments to back out manipulators’ counterfactual nonemployment survival
probability on the left side of the threshold. The exact estimation and calculation steps are
presented in Section 1.4.13
Effects of UI on the average individual and on non-manipulators: Counterfactual
outcomes allow us to recover the statistical relationship between such outcomes and age-at-layoff,
absent manipulation. Under some assumptions the jump in counterfactual outcomes at the
threshold gives us an estimate of the treatment effect of additional UI coverage for the average
individual in the population, akin to a Donut-RD design [Barreca et al., 2011]. In Figure 1.2b
this would correspond to the difference between the grey dots on the right and on the left of
the threshold. Responses obtained in this way are nothing but a weighted average of responses
for manipulators’ and non-manipulators, absent manipulation. Assuming that manipulators’
response after receiving four extra months of UI does not depend on whether they have chosen to
manipulate or whether they have been randomly assigned to such treatment, then the Donut-RD
coefficient, together with previously estimated manipulators’ response and shares allow us to
recover the implied response for non-manipulators. We use the latter to benchmark the results
for manipulators.
Selection into manipulation: The procedure illustrated in Figure 1.2b also lets us study selec-
tion into manipulation by comparing manipulators’ counterfactual outcomes to non-manipulators
realized outcomes. Figure 1.2b highlights this comparison and would suggest that even absent
manipulation, manipulators would have had a higher nonemployment survival rate than non-
manipulators due to the drop in the outcome variable to the left of the cutoff. This is indeed
what we show in Section 1.5. In light of the selection patterns we document, it is worth bearing
in mind that we are estimating the effect of manipulation on individuals who endogenously
decide to engage in manipulation, akin to a local average treatment effect.
13All confidence intervals in the paper are obtained by a simple non-parametric bootstrapping: we
operationalize this by resampling separation episodes and re-estimating the entire procedure – inclusive
of the share of manipulators – 5000 times.
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1.4 Regression Framework
In this section we present the details of how we operationalize our identification strategy in a
regression framework.
1.4.1 Estimating the number of manipulators
In order to quantify the amount of manipulation we follow standard bunching techniques
(Saez [2010], Chetty et al. [2011], Kleven and Waseem [2013]). At every age, we estimate a
counterfactual layoff frequency by fitting a second order polynomial to the observed frequency,
but excluding data from the manipulation region. Concretely, we group all layoffs into two week
bins based on the workers’ age at layoff and estimate the following specification:
cj = α+
P∑
p=0
βp · apj +
zU∑
k=zL
γk · I[aj = k] + νj , (1.5)
where cj denotes the absolute frequency of layoffs in headcounts in bin j, aj is the mid-point
age in bin j, P denotes the order of the polynomial. Coefficients γs control flexibly (bin-by-bin)
for differences between the observed data and the counterfactual frequency in the manipulation
region [zL, zU ].14 The whole counterfactual layoff frequency can be recovered from the fitted
values of equation (1.5) omitting the contributions of the missing and excess region dummies,
i.e. the counterfactual number of individuals in bin j is given by cˆj =
∑P
p=0 βˆp · apj . Notice that
γˆk < 0 if k belongs to the portion of the manipulation region before age fifty, while γˆk > 0 in
the portion of the manipulation region after age fifty. This sign difference will be important
below when we compute the shares of manipulators.
Crucial to our estimation procedure is a definition of the manipulation region [zL, zU ]. Here we
follow the procedure employed in Kleven and Waseem [2013]. We first rely on visual inspection
to determine zL. We set this to be six weeks away from the age fifty cutoff (three bins).
Subsequently, we try different specifications that increase zU by little margins (one bin at the
time), until the difference between the missing mass and the excess mass is sufficiently small. If
the counterfactual density could be recovered without error by a polynomial, we would stop
when
∑zL
k=zU γˆk · I[aj = k] = 0. In practice, we stop when this quantity falls below a critical
threshold. This procedure leaves us with a manipulation region of six weeks to the left and four
weeks to the right of the threshold. The distinction between the portion of the manipulation
region to the left and to the right of the threshold will be overly important in the following
14The inclusion of these dummies is equivalent to estimating the polynomial after excluding observa-
tions in the corresponding bins.
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analysis. For practical purposes we will refer to them as the “missing region” and the “excess
region”, respectively.
The observed layoff frequency and the estimated counterfactual let us compute the headcount
for several groups of individuals in the manipulation region, separately to the left and to the
right of the threshold. First, we define the total number of manipulators in the missing region
and non-manipulators in the missing region respectively as:
Nmissingmani =
∑
k∈missing
|γˆk| (1.6)
Nmissingnon-mani =
∑
k∈missing
ck. (1.7)
Second, we distinguish between manipulators in the excess region and all other individuals in
the excess region who are not manipulators. Formally, we define the total number of individuals
in each of these two groups as:
N excessmani =
∑
k∈excess
γˆk (1.8)
N excessw/o mani =
∑
k∈excess
ck − γˆk, (1.9)
respectively. Note that we deliberately reserve the term “non-manipulator” for individuals,
who were laid off before their fiftieth birthday and therefore – at least in principle – could
have engaged in manipulation but did not. Given the total headcounts, it is straightforward to
compute the share of manipulators in the missing and excess region, respectively, as follows:
smissing = N
missing
mani
Nmissingmani +N
missing
non-mani
(1.10)
sexcess = N
excess
mani
N excessmani +N excessw/o mani
. (1.11)
Similarly, we define the bin-by-bin shares as:
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smissing,k =
|γˆk|
|γˆk|+ ck for k ∈ missing (1.12)
sexcess,k =
γˆk
ck
for k ∈ excess. (1.13)
Having estimated a measure of the size of manipulation we now turn to studying affected
outcomes.
1.4.2 Estimating the effects of manipulation
In the previous section we constructed the number of manipulators and the share they represent
in the missing and excess region. We now move to the estimation of the effect of manipulation on
outcomes, such as benefit receipt or nonemployment survival, that are not directly manipulated
but might respond to manipulation. As outlined in Section 1.3.1, we relate differences in observed
and predicted outcomes in the missing and excess region to the missing and excess share of
manipulators to recover our outcomes of interest.
As a first step we run the following regression on individual-level data:
yi = α+
P∑
p=1
β≤50p · api · I[ai ≤ 50] +
P∑
p=0
β>50p · api · I[ai > 50]
+
zL∑
k=zU
δk · I[ai = k] + ξi,
(1.14)
where yi the outcome of interest, e.g. weeks of UI benefit receipt or probability of still being
nonemployed eight months after the layoff, β≤50p and β>50p are coefficients of two P th degree
polynomials in age, that are constructed based on information from the left-hand side and right-
hand side, respectively. Due to the inclusion of I[ai = k] indicator variables, the counterfactual
polynomial is estimated as if we were excluding observations from the manipulation region
[zL, zU ]. The coefficients δk capture the difference in average outcomes between the observed
data and the estimated counterfactual in the manipulation region.
Specification (1.14) allows for a treatment effect of longer PBD on average outcomes, i.e. β>500 .
We refer to β>500 as the “Donut” RD coefficient. This coefficient captures the average treatment
effect of four additional months of PBD for the average individual in the population, as shown in
Barreca et al. [2011]. We will use it to benchmark our results for the response of manipulators
(more on this below). Intuitively, β>500 recovers the difference between the two grey dots in
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Figure 1.2b.
The central idea of our estimation strategy is the re-scaling of these estimated differences (δk) by
the respective share of manipulators responsible for them. Formally let Y denote our outcome
of interest, e.g. UI benefit receipt, and Y¯ jl its average over group l in region j. For each bin k in
the missing region, we calculate
Y¯ missingnon-mani,k − Y¯ missingmani,k =
δk
smissingk
(1.15)
which gives us the difference in average (counterfactual) outcomes between manipulators and non-
manipulators, in bin k in the missing region. Note that the average outcome of non-manipulators
in bin k is observable and given by
Y¯ missingnon-mani,k =
∑N
i=1 yi · I[ai = k]
ck
, (1.16)
which allows us to recover manipulators’ counterfactual outcome in bin k as
Y¯ missingmani,k =
∑N
i=1 yi · I[ai = k]
ck
− δk
smissingk
(1.17)
and manipulators average counterfactual outcome over the entire missing region as
Y¯ missingmani =
1
Nmissingmani
∑
k
|γˆk| · Y¯ missingmani,k , (1.18)
where the γˆk are estimated in Section 1.4.1.15 The logic behind this re-scaling is straightforward:
if we found that the absence of 10% of individuals in the missing region resulted in a 100 unit
drop starting from a predicted counterfactual of 1000 units, we could infer that the now missing
individuals must have had an outcome of 1000−0.9×(1000−100)0.1 = 1900 units on average.
Following an analogous argument on the right-hand side of the age cutoff, we first re-scale the
regression coefficient for bin k to obtain
Y¯ excessmani,k − Y¯ excessw/o mani,k =
δk
sexcessk
. (1.19)
Notice that the observable average outcome in bin k in the excess region has to satisfy
15Equation 1.18 is nothing but an application of the law of iterated expectations, as average outcomes
in the bins are aggregated using the share of manipulators in each bin.
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Y¯ excessobserved,k =
∑N
i=1 yi · I[ai = k]
ck
=
γk · Y¯ excessmani,k + (ck − γk) · Y¯ excessw/o mani,k
ck
. (1.20)
Combining the two expressions above and rearranging terms gives us an estimate of manipulators’
actual outcome in the form of
Y¯ excessmani,k =
∑N
i=1 yi · I[ai = k]
ck
+ (1− sexcessk ) ·
δk
sexcessk
, (1.21)
for bin k in the excess region. We again calculate manipulators’ average actual outcome over
the entire excess region by
Y¯ excessmani =
1
N excessmani
·
∑
k
γk · Y¯ excessmani,k, (1.22)
which, together with equation (1.18) lets us define manipulators’ response (or treatment effect)
as
Y TEmani ≡ Y¯ excessmani − Y¯ missingmani . (1.23)
1.4.3 Recovering the implied response of non-manipulators
Having obtained an estimate of manipulators’ response we benchmark these results against the
implied response of non-manipulators. As noted above, β>500 provides an estimate of the effect
of four additional months of PBD for an average individual who is moved over the threshold
exogenously (i.e. without manipulation). Assuming that manipulators would have shown the
same response to additional PBD coverage had they been moved over the threshold exogenously
we can decompose the response for the average individual as follows:
smissing · Y TEmani + (1− smissing) · Y TEnon-mani = β>500 . (1.24)
A fraction of smissing of the estimated jump in the polynomionmal β>500 is due to the response of
manipulators, the remaining (1− smissing) has to be due to the response of non-manipulators.16
16The assumption that manipulators’ response would have been the same had they been moved over
the threshold exogenously seems plausible in our setting and would, for instance, hold in a fixed cost
model of manipulation.
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Rearranging thus gives us an estimate for non-manipulators’ response:
Y TEnon-mani =
β>500 − smissing · Y TEmani
1− smissing . (1.25)
1.5 Results
In this section we examine the main findings. We start by presenting graphical evidence of
manipulation in the form of strategic delays in the timing of layoffs around the fiftieth birthday
threshold. After quantifying the magnitude of manipulation, we estimate the additional increase
in UI receipt and actual UI duration that arises from manipulators’ strategic behavior. Building
on the insight that part of this increase may simply capture the fact that manipulators have
higher invariant risk of being long-term non employed, we proceed to decompose such an increase
into a mechanical and behavioral component. We do so by combining information on the
statutory replacement rates with a survival analysis at the monthly frequency. Despite the
fact that financing manipulators’ extra coverage is expensive, we highlight that most of the
increase in cost is mechanical and would have arisen even absent any subsequent decrease in job
search effort. When exploring this result in more detail, we do indeed find that manipulators
have substantially higher risk of exhausting the eight month UI scheme, compared to non
manipulators. This is consistent with the idea that manipulators may be motivated by their
long-term non employment risk, rather than anticipated moral hazard responses. In the final
subsection we also use a similar method to characterize manipulators and non-manipulators on
the basis of observable characteristics. Among manipulators we find a higher fraction of female,
workers employed in part-time jobs and in small firms. Furthermore manipulation is confined to
open-ended contracts in the private sector. We now move to a more thorough description of our
results.
1.5.1 Evidence of manipulation
To provide graphical evidence of manipulation, Figure 1.3 plots the relative frequency of layoffs
against workers’ age at layoff. Figure 1.3b covers the entire age range from 26 to 64 years of age,
while Figure 1.3a zooms into a narrower, four year window around the age-fifty threshold.17
17By plotting the layoff frequency over the entire age range in Figure 1.3b, we already rule out that
manipulation is caused by other mechanisms like (round-) birthday effects. All our estimates for the
counterfactual density and counterfactual outcomes are based on the narrower (46-54) window. Section
1.6 presents additional robustness checks.
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Both figures show a clear drop in the frequency of layoffs just before, and a pronounced spike
after, the age-fifty threshold.
Following our estimation strategy outlined in Section 1.4.1, we find the manipulation region to
consist of all bins from six weeks before (missing region), up to four weeks after the threshold
(excess region). Table 1.2 reports our estimates for the respective headcounts for the four
groups of interest: manipulators in the missing region, non-manipulators in the missing region,
manipulators in the excess region and all individuals in the excess region who are not manipulators,
as well as share estimates for the missing and excess region (see equations (1.6) - (1.11) above).
We estimate that a total of 571 layoffs are strategically delayed corresponding to 15.8% of layoffs
in the missing region. The counterfactual relationship appears almost perfectly linear and is
robust to the choice of the order of the polynomial. The estimated number of manipulators in
the excess region, 609, deviates slightly from that in the missing region due to measurement
error and corresponds to approximately 20.3% of layoffs in the excess region.
We consider the evidence presented until here as this papers’ first contribution. It documents that
incentives generated by the UI system can influence the timing dimension of layoffs and thereby
the length of an employment spell. Complementing previous work on the extensive margin
response of job separations, we focus on the timing dimension of the layoff decision.18 Having
established sizable manipulation, we now turn to the estimation of its effect on manipulators’
benefit receipt.
1.5.2 Effects of manipulation: UI benefit receipt and duration
Successful manipulation provides workers with four more months of potential UI coverage, after
the eighth month of nonemployment. In this section we study the effects of such longer coverage
on manipulators’ actual benefit receipt and benefit duration. We begin by plotting these outcomes
against workers’ age at layoff in Figure 1.4a and 1.4b, respectively. The observed pattern in
the raw data fits with the model of manipulation we laid out in Section 1.3 and constitutes
clear non-parametric evidence that UI receipt and actual duration respond to manipulation.
As explained in Section 1.4.2 our procedure combines abnormal changes in outcomes near the
threshold with the share of manipulators causing them. This allows us to retrieve manipulators’
as well as non-manipulators’ responses.
We report all relevant estimates with associated 95% confidence intervals in Tables 1.3 and
1.4. Our estimates indicate that manipulators would have collected 5814.2 Euros, and spent
27.8 weeks on benefits, had they not manipulated (column (1)). When manipulation lengthens
18Jäger et al. [2018] and Doornik et al. [2018] both study the extensive margin response of job
separations to UI benefits.
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individual UI coverage, these figures jump up to 8053.6 Euros and 41.8 weeks, generating an
increase in fiscal outlays of 2239 Euros per manipulator. In order to benchmark this number,
we compute the same increase for non-manipulators, which we report in column (6). We find
that this corresponds to 1637 Euros only. From an accounting perspective our results indicate
that overall it would be cheaper to finance longer coverage for non-manipulators rather than
for manipulators. However, the size of the efficiency cost of financing manipulators’ crucially
depends on subsequent behavioral changes that purposefully reduce the probability of finding a
new job. We therefore ask a more interesting question: what fraction of these additional UI
expenditures is actually due to behavioral responses and how much is instead mechanically due
to longer coverage? In the next subsection we make use of a survival analysis to shed light on
this question.
1.5.3 Distinguishing behavioral responses from mechanical effects
In this section we make use of the methodology presented in Section 1.3 to decompose UI receipt
and actual duration response into a mechanical and a behavioral component, so as to shed
light on the effective moral hazard cost of manipulation. Nonemployment survival probabilities,
together with information on statutory replacement rates, are the crucial pieces of information
needed to measure the relative size of these two sources of cost. Intuitively, it is important to
understand when manipulators respond, in order to distinguish between relatively expensive
moral hazard responses during months of benefit receipt from those that happen after benefit
exhaustion.
Similarly to what we did for UI receipt and duration, in Figure 1.5 we report the observed
relationship between survival in nonemployment and age at layoff for a selected set of months
after separation. Qualitatively, we observe bigger jumps around the thresholds precisely during
the months with extra coverage. Within the manipulation region we also see outcome changes
that are abnormal, compared to what could be predicted by the data outside of it. Similarly to
before, we combine these changes with the share of manipulators causing them to trace monthly
survival curves for both manipulators and non-manipulators.
Figure 1.6a shows the estimated nonemployment survival curve of manipulators under the eight
and twelve months PBD scheme. Figure 1.6b reports the difference between the two curves
at any point, with associated bootstrapped 95% confidence bands. The difference between
the two curves reveals the effect of longer PBD along manipulators’ survival curve. It shows
virtually no difference in survival probabilities in the first six to seven months, after which
the two curves start diverging. The shift in manipulators’ survival curve is substantial with
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their nonemployment probability after twelve months increasing by 16.7 p.p. due to the more
generous scheme. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the behavioral response is concentrated in the months
eight to twelve and coincides with the time of extended UI coverage. However, as pointed out,
there is very little evidence of moral hazard in the first eight months of nonemployment. The
difference between the two curves then decreases again after month twelve, consistent with the
idea that these individuals increase their job search efforts again once the benefits expire. We
replicate the same type of analysis for non-manipulators and report it in Figure 1.7a and 1.7b.
The qualitative picture is similar. Also in this case we see very limited anticipatory responses
of longer coverage during the months zero to eight, and a pronounced divergence after month
eight, indicative of a moral hazard response.19
Absolute shifts alone are not appropriate to represent efficiency costs because they ignore the
fact that not all individuals have the same probability of still being nonemployed during the
periods of longer coverage. To solve this issue we follow Schmieder et al. [2012] and compute
BC/MC ratios, as detailed in Section 1.3.1. We compute these ratios by numerically integrating
the survival curves over the relevant ranges, and appropriately weighting by statutory survival
rates. We perform integration by using the midpoint rule and impose that the behavioral cost
has to be weakly positive at any given point.20
We report BC/MC ratios in Table 1.5. In column (1) we report the simple BC/MC ratio, as
in equation 1.2. Manipulators’ estimate of 0.24 implies that for one additional Euro used to
provide longer UI coverage in the months eight to twelve the government would have to spend
an additional 24 cents due to behavioral responses that occurs in months zero to twelve. The
corresponding estimate for non-manipulators’ is remarkably similar, implying that manipulators
are not adversely selected on the basis of their effective moral hazard cost. In column (2) we
enrich our analysis by following equation 1.4 by also considering the cost of lost tax revenue
during the whole nonemployment spell. These numbers are higher because the government
is marginally losing money out of the UI system due to long nonemployment durations. In
selecting the tax rate we follow Schmieder and Von Wachter [2016] and use a 3% tax rate.
Also in this case, numbers across the two groups are virtually identical. Together these results
reinforce the idea that manipulators’ responses in terms of decreased job search effort do not
generate efficiency costs that are higher than those of the average individuals in the same age
19Due to the fact that non-manipulators’ actual survival curve under the eight-month scheme is
observed and not estimated, confidence bands are much narrower.
20In the first few months the point estimates indicate that the survival probability in nonemployment
slightly decreases as a consequence of higher PBD. As these negative contributions to the overall integral
would lead us to underestimate BC/MC ratios for manipulators, we want to stay as conservative as
possible by making sure that our results do not depend on these unusual patterns in the data at the
beginning of the spell. Results are qualitatively unaltered whenever we do not impose this non-negativity
constraint.
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range. This may also mitigate concerns that selection on anticipated moral hazard is the prime
motive behind manipulation. As a final note, it is worth pointing out that our BC/MC ratios
for manipulators, as well as for the non-manipulators, are in the lower range of estimates in the
previous literature (see Schmieder and Von Wachter [2016] for an overview).
1.5.4 Selection on long-term nonemployment risk
While manipulators are not adversely selected on their effective moral hazard cost, it is still true
that financing their UI coverage is more expensive from a budgeting perspective. As a matter
of fact in Table 1.3 we previously saw that providing four additional months of UI coverage
increased the average UI benefit receipt by 2239 Euros for manipulators and only by 1637 Euros
for non-manipulators. This seems to suggest that manipulators are instead adversely selected
on their long-term nonemployment risk. In this subsection we corroborate this hypothesis by
showing that manipulators’ have higher UI exhaustion rates even when they have the same
PBD as non-manipulators. Figure 1.8a illustrates this point by plotting survival rates for
manipulators and non-manipulators under the eight month scheme. Comparing manipulators
and non-manipulators when they face the same incentives isolates permanent differences in risk.
The figure illustrates that even with shorter PBD, the probability of exhausting such benefits
without finding a new job is almost 20 p.p. higher for manipulators. The large exhaustion risk
is what makes most of the increases in benefit receipt and duration mechanical and thus lowers
the BC/MC ratio, ceteris paribus.
1.5.5 Characterizing manipulators
Until now we have quantified manipulation and studied its consequences, but we have abstrac-
ted from understanding how it occurs. In this section we present a characterization of the
manipulators along observable characteristics, in order to provide some suggestive evidence
on the economic mechanisms that generate it. In Figure 1.9 we start by visually inspecting
the age distribution of layoffs for different types of contracts (permanent and temporary) and
sectors (private and public). Workers in the public sector, either with permanent or temporary
contracts, show little ability or interest to delay their layoff and the density of layoff does not
exhibit any discontinuous pattern for either of these groups. The density for workers laid off
from permanent contracts in the public sector also shows substantial variance, due to a smaller
number of individuals. Once we move to the private sector, we can observe that workers on
permanent contracts are able to manipulate their date of layoff, while the same is not true
for workers on temporary contracts. This is consistent with temporary workers having little
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ability choose a start date for their contracts that positions them on the right-hand-side of the
threshold, once laid off. It is also consistent with lower bargaining power with the employer,
due to e.g. shorter tenure.21
In what follows we focus on the subset of workers who claimed UI after losing a permanent job
in the private sector, which was also our sample of interest in the main analysis. To provide
a more precise assessment, we make use of a procedure developed in [Diamond and Persson,
2017, Section 6.2]. The idea is similar in spirit to the rest of our analysis. Let us say that
we want to investigate whether manipulators are more likely to have a given characteristic,
e.g. being female. If there are disproportionately more (less) women in the excess (missing)
region compared to what a fitted counterfactual would predict, then manipulators are more
likely to be female. Results are in Table 1.7. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimated mean
characteristic for manipulators and non-manipulators, respectively. The difference of the two is
reported in column (3), together with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. In column (4)
we report the estimated mean for yet another group, i.e. all individuals whose unmanipulated
age-at-layoff falls in the missing region. We find that manipulators are 18 p.p. more likely than
non-manipulators to be female, 17 p.p. more likely to be employed in white collar jobs and 7
p.p. less likely to have full-time contracts. We observe that their wages are 6% lower, although
estimates are relatively imprecise. No significant difference emerges in terms of tenure and
geographic location. We notice that firm size is an important element: manipulators come from
firms that are about 40% smaller with respect to firm of non-manipulators. We only see minor
and statistically insignificant differences in terms of age of the firm. We can only speculate as
to the reasons behind the firm-size differential in manipulation: the effect may work through
personal relationships, workers’ (credible) threat to sue the firm for unjust dismissal, or direct
bribes paid with part of the extra UI. Our data do not allow us to disentangle these possibilities
and leave this question to future research. Overall, these findings suggest that adjustment
costs, bargaining power and proximity to managers play a role in workers’ ability to engage in
manipulation.
1.6 Robustness
1.6.1 Placebo tests
One key identifying assumption of our empirical strategy is that the bunching patterns we
observe in the data just reflect the strong incentives given by higher PBD and are not linked to
21Although the McCrary test identifies the presence a discontinuity also in this case, this is substantially
smaller than the one observed for workers coming from permanent contracts.
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other institutional features of the labor market discretely changing at age fifty. In this subsection
we test this assumption by looking at two other UI schemes that were introduced after 2012 and
that did not feature sharp changes in generosity at age fifty. Intuitively we would expect to see
no missing and excess mass to the left and to the right of the threshold, respectively. In Figure
1.10 we report the corresponding layoff densities. In order to be consistent with our original
sample definition, we focus on workers who were employed on permanent contracts in the private
sector. In both cases we fail to detect any graphical evidence of manipulation and see that the
density evolves smoothly around the threshold. This suggests that the discontinuous shape of
the density in our main sample is directly related to the PBD extension that characterized the
OUB scheme.
1.6.2 Extensive margin responses
Manipulation induces a re-timing of existing layoffs from the weeks immediately preceding
workers’ fiftieth birthday to right after, generating a missing and an excess mass compared to
the counterfactual frequency. One of the identifying assumptions of the methods used in this
paper is that manipulation is the only reason why we observe these changes in the vicinity of
the threshold. However, if longer PBD increases workers’ outside option out of employment,
it is possible that the number of layoffs discontinuously increases after age fifty, even absent
any manipulation. We call this increase an “extensive margin response". This is worrisome for
two reasons: first we would be mismeasuring the upper bound of the manipulation region (zU ),
and second, if the extra layoffs are selected, we would be altering the composition of jobs in the
manipulation region for reasons other than manipulation, introducing a bias.
The nature of the selection is not straightforward. As discussed in Jäger et al. [2018], in a
standard Coesean bargaining framework, positive changes in workers’ outside options induce
separations for those (marginal) jobs that have relatively low joint (firm + worker) surplus.
These could be e.g. the least productive jobs employing the least skilled workers. In other
(non-Coasean) settings, changes in outside options induce a higher number of separations among
jobs with low workers’ surplus. These could be the workers who value leisure relatively more
or are employed in physically strenuous occupations, and not necessarily the least productive
ones. In both cases this extensive margin response on the number of separations would alter
the composition of jobs in a way that is potentially correlated with outcomes of interest. These
concerns are not purely theoretical: Feldstein [1976], Feldstein [1978] and Topel [1983] provided
a theoretical framework and some preliminary evidence on how more generous benefits may
generate additional layoffs. Jäger et al. [2018] also finds an effect of extended PBD on job
separation rates in Austria. They find that the job matches of the workers who do not separate
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are not more resilient in subsequent years, casting doubts on the Coasean framework. Recent
work by Albanese et al. [2019] documented an increase in the probability of separation for Italian
workers who become eligible to the OUB scheme for the first time. In what follows, we show
these concerns find little empirical support in our setting.
In testing for the importance of extensive margin responses, we consider two different scenarios.
In the first scenario, all jobs can be hit by random shocks that decrease their value, and whose
distribution does not feature any point of discontinuity. Since all jobs to the right of the
threshold are less resilient due to lower worker surplus, we would expect to see an upward shift
in the whole density of layoffs. In the second scenario, there are no shocks, but a limited set
of jobs with small and positive surplus will mature into negative surplus as workers’ age cross
the age-fifty threshold, due to increased outside option of the worker. In this case additional
layoffs might be concentrated right after workers’ fiftieth birthday, with the following age bins
being unaffected. We analyse the former case by checking whether either the layoff density or
workers’ observable characteristics exhibit a jump at the threshold, even after accounting for
the presence of manipulation. We then consider the latter case by a direct comparison of the
excess and missing masses under different definitions. Finally, we discuss sample-related and
institutional reasons which cast doubt on the presence of extensive margin effects in our setting.
1.6.3 Testing for shifts in the density
Let us now turn to the first check: we look at whether the layoff density exhibits an upward
shift at age fifty even after flexibly controlling for the presence of manipulation. We do so by
running a classic RD model on the layoff density, but excluding observations belonging to the
manipulation region.The estimating equation reads as follows:
dj = α+ λ · aj + γ · I[aj ≥ 50] + δ · I[aj ≥ 50] · aj + νj , (1.26)
where dj is the density of layoffs in bin j, aj is the mid-point age in the bin and νj is an error
term. Our coefficient of interest is γ, which represents the possible discontinuity in the density
at the age fifty threshold. Ideally the coefficient should be close to zero, indicating no extensive
margin responses.22 We report the results in Table 1.8. In column (1) we run equation 1.26
on the whole sample, that is also including the manipulation region. As expected we detect
22Note that in this case we have used a linear specification instead of a quadratic, as higher order
polynomial would provide too much weight on extreme observations and might lead to a poorer overall
fit. The Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion both suggest that the linear
and quadratic specification are roughly equivalent, although the linear one is slightly preferred. Other
measures of goodness of fit such as the R2 also show substantial equivalence of the two models.
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a significant jump at the threshold, which is consistent with excess layoffs after age fifty. In
column (2) we run the same model but exclude observations in the manipulation region. We find
that the discontinuity becomes much less relevant quantitatively, and statistically not different
from zero. In column (3) we repeat the same exercise but with an alternative and extended
definition of the manipulation region. Contrary to the traditional Kleven and Waseem [2013]
method here we use as missing (excess) region the one characterized by the longest sequence
of negative (positive) coefficients starting from the threshold. The resulting missing region
is substantially larger and it goes up to 4 months before the cutoff (9 bins) while the excess
region is remarkably similar and it adds only a couple of bins to the one used in our baseline
estimates.23 This involves a simple assumption of continuity and increasing cost of manipulation
in the distance from the threshold, and delivers convex missing and excess regions. Also in this
case the estimate for γ is quantitatively negligible.
1.6.4 Testing for discontinuities in observable characteristics
As a second check, we assess whether workers separating on either side of the cutoff differ
systematically, above and beyond what can be explained by manipulation. We therefore run
two regression models, a naive one that does not control for manipulation (and serves as a
benchmark) and one that explicitly controls for it. The naive model, ran on the full sample
reads:
xi = α+
P∑
p=1
λ≤50p · api · I[ai < 50] +
P∑
p=0
λ>50p · api · I[ai ≥ 50] + ξi (1.27)
which is a standard RD model where λ>500 is the jump at the threshold. The other model adds
bin-by-bin indicator variables for the manipulation region and is as follows:
xi = κ+
P∑
p=1
θ≤50p · api · I[ai < 50] +
P∑
p=0
θ>50p · api · I[ai ≥ 50]
+
zL∑
k=zU
δk · I[ai = k] + νi,
(1.28)
If manipulators are selected on observables, we would expect λ>500 to be different from zero, a
23In order to reduce the influence of very small coefficients, we ignore the sign of a coefficient if its
absolute value is smaller or equal to 1/1000 of the average density across all bins. This is roughly equal
to a deviation of three workers from the predicted counterfactual.
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point also raised in section 1.5.5. If however manipulation is the only reason why selection arises,
we would expect θ>500 to be equal to zero. We reports tests on these two coefficients in Table
1.6 for a large set of observable characteristics. Columns (1) to (3) report estimates from model
1.27. Observable characteristics are indeed different on the two sides of the threshold, because
of manipulation, but potentially also because of extensive margin responses. Columns (3)-(5)
rule this last channel out. The fact that, after accounting for manipulation, the distribution
of observable characteristics is continuous at the threshold makes the presence of additional
layoffs related to changes workers’ outside options. This is very reassuring for the validity of our
design, as it seems that changes in PBD do not induce extensive margin changes in the number
of layoffs.
1.6.5 Testing for the presence of extra excess mass
So far, these analyses suggest negligible effects of unemployment benefits on layoffs. We now
move to testing the second type of extensive margin response, that is the one that emerges only
near the threshold. The basic idea behind the test we propose now is to see if we can detect
additional excess mass to the right of the cutoff, above and beyond what would be predicted by
the missing mass. In absence of extensive margin responses, excess and missing mass should
be equal, so any difference in favour of the excess mass would make us think PBD is inducing
extra layoffs right after the threshold. In order to implement our test, we estimate the following
regression model on the layoff density:
cj = α+ βaj +
50−∑
k=A
γ˜k · I[aj = k] +
B∑
k=50+
δ˜k · I[aj = k] + ζj (1.29)
Where the set of γ˜k and δ˜k coefficients are enough to measure the size of the manipulation
region. Same as in 1.6.3 we consider an extended manipulation region that includes bins from 18
weeks before workers’ fiftieth birthday up to 8 weeks afterwards. The lower and upper bounds
are denoted by A < zL and B > zU , respectively. After having estimated the previous equation
we rescale the difference between excess and missing mass by the excess mass itself. This yields
the share of the excess mass that can be explained by extensive margin responses. Such share
amounts to only 1.3%, which is very reassuring about the validity of our identification strategy.
1.6.6 Why are extensive margin responses so small?
In this subsection we discuss why it might be plausible that our extensive margin responses are
smaller compared to those found in the studies of Jäger et al. [2018] and Albanese et al. [2019].
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Broadly speaking, the reasons have to do with the fact that benefit changes at the threshold
are smaller compared to those in these studies, and also that some institutional features in our
setting limit the scope for big behavioral responses at the extensive margin.
More specifically, Jäger et al. [2018] study an Austrian policy change that in 1988 increased PBD
from 30 to 209 weeks, a seven-fold increase. This is much larger than in our case, where PBD
increased just by 50%. Differences in our estimation strategies and setting make it difficult to
map our results and theirs directly. Here we just perform a back of the envelope calculation that
assumes linearity in the effects of longer PBD. Jäger et al. [2018] find an increase of separations
by 11 percentage points over a baseline of 36%, implying a β of 11209−30 = 0.061. Since in Italy
the absolute change in the number of weeks of PBD has been 4 × 4.33 = 17.32, the implied
increase in separation in Italy would have been 17.32× 0.061 = 1.06 percentage points.24 This
would represent a very small change in our overall density and it unlikely to generate substantial
bias.
Secondly, it is worth stressing that two features of our institutional setting make it difficult
to extend results from Jäger et al. [2018] to our framework. A relevant aspect that should
be taken into account is that the higher separation rate in Austria is partly driven by quits
rather than layoff. Indeed, in the Austrian system workers who quit their job are eligible to
receive unemployment benefits while this is not possible in Italian legislation, unless under
particular circumstances. In addition, the longer unemployment benefits under the Austrian
REBP scheme could be used by workers to bridge towards retirement after turning 55. This
made unemployment more attractive to workers. The Italian pension system was, in the period
considered, much less generous. Even with seniority pensions, workers needed to be close to
sixty year old to retire. Both these differences make it less likely that the extension of potential
benefit duration leads to excess layoffs.
We now turn to comparing our work to Albanese et al. [2019], who find a sizable increase in
the separation rate for workers who become eligible to the OUB scheme in Italy for the first
time. We present two reasons why we think these responses are unlikely to be present in our
sample, although we are studying the same UI scheme. First of all it is worth stressing that
the workers in our sample have already experienced a jump their PBD in the past, precisely
when they met their eligibility criteria. It follows that the observed matches, which end in a
separation in our dataset, have already survived a large increase in their outside option, so
they should be less sensitive to further increases in it. Secondly, Albanese et al. [2019] exploit
24Alternatively one could assume that proportional (and not absolute) changes are constant and
do similar calculations by deriving an elasticity. Using the numbers above we find such elasticity to
be 11/36179/30 = 0.051. This would imply that the predicted percentage change in the Italian setting is
0.051× 50% = 2.55%.
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variation in UI eligibility rules, which allow workers with no UI to have access to some. We
instead study variation at the intensive margin, since our workers obtain four extra months of
PBD. Whether these two responses should be the same has not been explored so far but it can
be argued that the former should be larger than the latter. To our knowledge there is no explicit
analysis of this aspect in existing studies and we leave it to future research. All in all, all these
considerations might explain the discrepancy between our results and the higher probability of
separation identified by Albanese et al. [2019].
1.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies manipulation in the context of unemployment insurance. We document
substantial manipulation in forms of strategic delays in the timing of layoffs around an age-at-
layoff threshold entitling workers to a four months increase in potential UI benefit duration in
Italy. Using bunching techniques we study the selection pattern and moral hazard response of
manipulators. We argue that changes in subsequent job search intensities are informative about
the underlying motives for manipulation and we identify long-term nonemployment risk as an
important factor for selecting into manipulation. Manipulators are only modestly responsive to
the increase in UI coverage mitigating concerns about anticipated moral hazard.
All in all, we illustrate how a more comprehensive understanding of the underlying motivation
for manipulation might shape how the phenomenon is perceived. Furthermore, our results
highlight the importance to take layoff responses into account when designing differentiated UI
schemes and point to potential limits of governments’ ability to target UI benefits.
Although a full welfare assessment is beyond the scope of this paper we deem it a fruitful avenue
for future research. So is the more general question of the desirability of differentiated UI
policies.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: The moral hazard cost of extended UI coverage
Note: The figure displays manipulators’ survival curves (St) in nonemployment under two alternative
scenarios: manipulators’ potential benefit duration (PBD) is eight months (solid line), and manipulators’
PBD is twelve months (dashed line). The dashed line is above the solid line under the assumption
that higher PDB lowers the hazard rate of exit from nonemployment. The curves are simulated as
negative exponentials with a constant hazard rate of 5% and 3%, respectively. The increase in the fiscal
cost (shaded areas) is due to two components: (1) the mechanical cost (light-shaded area) due to extra
UI outlays covering months eight to twelve, absent any behavioral change; (2) behavioral component
(dark-shaded area) due to a shift in the survival curve in months zero to twelve, induced by the change
in PBD. The effective moral hazard cost is given by the ratio of (2) and (1).
37
Figure 1.2: Illustration of identification strategy
(a) Quantifying manipulation
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Note: The figure visualizes our identification strategy. Panel (a) illustrates how we estimate
the number and respective share of manipulators in both the missing and excess region.
Panel (b) constructs manipulators’ survival response and illustrates the relevant comparison
when studying selection into manipulation. Section 1.4 lays out how we estimate the fitted
counterfactuals in practice.
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Figure 1.3: Layoff frequency for permanent contract private sector workers
(a) Age-at-layoff between 46 and 54 years
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(b) Age-at-layoff between 26 and 64 years
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Note: The figure shows the density of layoffs in the private sector, for individuals working
on a permanent contract and claiming regular UI (OUB). The data cover the period
February 2009 till December 2012. Panel (a) plots the density for the age range from 46
to 54 years, while Panel (b) does so for the entire age range from 26 to 64 years of age.
In both panels each dot represents a two-week bin. The underlying data in Panel (a)
consists of 249,581 layoffs.
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Figure 1.4: Benefit receipt and duration
(a) average UI receipt in euros
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Note: The figure displays the average UI receipt in euros (panel (a)) and average UI
benefit duration in weeks (panel (b)) by age-at-layoff. In both panels each dot represents
a two week bin. The sample includes all individuals working on a permanent contract
and claiming regular UI (OUB). The data cover the period February 2009 till December
2012. The underlying data consists of 249,581 layoffs.
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Figure 1.5: Nonemployment survival probabilities
(a) Probability of still being unemployed after 3
months
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(b) Probability of still being unemployed after 6
months
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(c) Probability of still being unemployed after 9
months
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(d) Probability of still being unemployed after 12
months
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(e) Probability of still being unemployed after 15
months
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(f) Probability of still being unemployed after 18
months
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(g) Probability of still being unemployed after 21
months
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(h) Probability of still being unemployed after 24
months
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Note: The figures show the share of laid off workers, who are still unemployed after 3, 6, ..., 24 months.
In all panels each dot represents a two week bin. The sample includes all individuals working on a
permanent contract and claiming regular UI (OUB). The data cover the period February 2009 till
December 2012. The underlying data consists of 249,581 layoffs.
41
Figure 1.6: Manipulators with 8 and 12 months of potential benefit duration
(a) Nonemployment survival rates
(b) Difference in survival rates
Note: Panel (a) plots point estimates of manipulators’ actual and counterfactual nonem-
ployment survival for the first 32 months after layoff. Our estimation strategy is outlined in
section 1.4.2. Panel (b) shows the difference between the two survival curves and contains
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals testing against zero difference.
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Figure 1.7: Manipulators with 8 and 12 months of potential benefit duration
(a) Nonemployment survival rates
(b) Difference in survival rates
Note: Panel (a) plots point estimates of non-manipulators’ actual and counterfactual nonem-
ployment survival for the first 32 months after layoff. Our estimation strategy is outlined in
section 1.4.2. Panel (b) shows the difference between the two survival curves and contains
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals testing against zero difference.
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Figure 1.8: Manipulators and non-manipulators with 8 months of potential benefit
duration
(a) Nonemployment survival rates
(b) Difference in survival rates
Note: Panel (a) plots point estimates of manipulators’ and non-manipulators’ nonemployment
survival over the first 32 months after layoff under eight months of PBD. The estimation of
the former is outlined in section 1.4.2. The latter represents the observed mean survival rate
in the missing region. Panel (b) shows the difference between the two survival curves and
contains bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals testing against zero difference.
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Figure 1.9: Density of Layoff by Private and Public sector and by Contract Type
(a) Public Sector: Permanent
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Note: The figure shows the density of layoffs by contract type. The data cover the period February
2009 till December 2012. In all panels each dot represents a two-week bin. Individuals are classified as
“public sector” workers if they are present in the SIP database but a corresponding employment spell
could not be observed in the data for universe of workers in the private sector (UNIEMENS).
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Figure 1.10: Placebo checks: MiniASpI and NASpI and density of recipients at 50 years
of age
(a) MiniASpI
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Note: The figure shows the density of layoffs for workers laid off in the private sector
and receiving MiniASpI (2013-April 2015) or NASpI (2016). In both panels each dot
represents a two-week bin. The sample has been restricted to workers coming from
permanent contracts in the private sector.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Nonemployment outcomes
UI Benefit receipt duration (in weeks) 29.853 15.923 0.14 52.00
Nonemployment duration (in weeks) 89.995 79.092 0.00 208.00
Nonemployment survival prob. 8 months 0.502 0.500 0.00 1.00
Nonemployment survival prob. 12
months
0.388 0.487 0.00 1.00
Individual characteristics
Female (share) 0.311 0.463 0.00 1.00
Time since first employment (in years) 27.656 8.552 2.00 40.00
White collar (share) 0.208 0.406 0.00 1.00
North (share) 0.367 0.482 0.00 1.00
Center (share) 0.174 0.379 0.00 1.00
South and islands (share) 0.459 0.498 0.00 1.00
Previous job characteristics
Full time (share) 0.807 0.395 0.00 1.00
Tenure (in years) 5.931 6.113 0.08 30.00
Daily income (in Euros) 69.900 70.300 0.04 13,981.01
Firm age (in years) 14.367 12.115 0.00 109.83
Firm size 28.158 259.010 1.00 14,103.00
Firm size below 15 (share) 0.606 0.489 0.00 1.00
Firm size between 15 and 49 (share) 0.213 0.409 0.00 1.00
Firm size above 49 (share) 0.181 0.385 0.00 1.00
Note: The table reports summary statistics of our main sample consisting of all OUB claims between
February 2009 and December 2012 from individuals who are employed in permanent private sector
work arrangements and are between 46-54 years of age at the time of layoff. The sample contains a
total of 249,581 nonemployment spells from 210,041 individual workers. Nonemployment duration is
censored at four years and defined as the time distance between the date of layoff and the date of the
first re-employment event that leads to UI benefit termination. Tenure is defined as the total number of
years (not necessarily uninterrupted) spent with the last employer. The geographical South and islands
dummy encompasses employment in one of the following regions: Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Molise,
Puglia, Sardinia and Sicilia.
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Table 1.2: Headcount and share estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Headcount Headcount Headcount Headcount Share Share
manipulators non-manipulators manipulators all other ind. estimate estimate
missing region missing region excess region excess region missing excess
571.2 3038.0 608.6 2390.4 0.158 0.203
(458.5,680.0) (2931.0,3150.0) (496.0,718.5) (2379.4,2401.3) (0.127,0.188) (0.172,0.231)
Note: The table reports estimates of the total number of individuals in four groups: (1) manipulators in the missing
region, (2) non-manipulators in the missing region, (3) manipulators in the excess region and (4) all other individuals in
the excess region. Column (5) and (6) contain estimates for the share of manipulators in the missing and excess region,
respectively. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. We formally define all quantities in Section 1.4.1.
All results are based on our main sample consisting of 249,581 observations.
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Table 1.3: UI Benefit receipt estimates (Euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benefit receipt Benefit receipt Benefit receipt Benefit receipt Benefit receipt Benefit receipt
manipulators non-manipulators manipulators all other ind. response response
missing region missing region excess region excess region manipulators non-manipulators
5814.2 5223.5 8053.6 7044.2 2239.4 1636.9
(5178.5, 6459.2) (5125.0, 5325.7) (7326.9, 8836.5) (6974.5, 7112.4) (1276.7,3261.6) (1410.9,1849.6)
Note: The table reports estimates of the mean UI benefit receipt (in Euro) of individuals in four groups: (1) manipulators in the missing
region, (2) non-manipulators in the missing region, (3) manipulators in the excess region and (4) all other individuals in the excess
region. Column (5) and (6) contain estimates of the UI benefit receipt response of manipulators and non-manipulators, respectively.
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are in parenthesis. We formally define all quantities in Section 1.4.2. All results are based on our
main sample consisting of 249,581 observations.
Table 1.4: Benefit duration estimates (weeks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benefit duration Benefit duration Benefit duration Benefit duration Benefit duration Benefit duration
manipulators non-manipulators manipulators all other ind. response response
missing region missing region excess region excess region manipulators non-manipulators
27.8 24.8 41.8 35.8 13.9 9.9
(25.2,30.6) (24.4,25.2) (38.3,45.6) (35.5,36.2) (9.4,18.7) (8.9,10.9)
Note: The table reports estimates of the mean benefit duration (in weeks) of individuals in four groups: (1) manipulators in the missing
region, (2) non-manipulators in the missing region, (3) manipulators in the excess region and (4) all other individuals in the excess region.
Column (5) and (6) contain estimates of the benefit duration response of manipulators and non-manipulators, respectively. Bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals are in parenthesis. We formally define all quantities in Section 1.4.2. All results are based on our main sample
consisting of 249,581 observations.
49
Table 1.5: BC/MC Ratios
BC/MC ratios
(1) (2)
without taxes with taxes
(τ = 3%)
(a) Manipulators 0.24 0.32
[0.02; 0.89] [0.03; 1.13]
(b) Non-manipulators 0.26 0.32
[0.12; 0.41] [0.15; 0.50]
Note: The table reports BC/MC ratios for manipulators (a) and
non-manipulators (b). BC/MC without taxes are defined in
equation 1.2 in Section 1.3.1. BC/MC with taxes are defined in
equation 1.4 in the same section. Bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals in parentheses.
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Table 1.6: Test for Discontinuity of observables at cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Simple RD model “Donut” model
Variable λ>500 s.e. T-stat (1)/(2) θ>500 s.e. T-stat (4)/(5) Baseline
Female 0.011 0.005 2.43 0.000 0.005 -0.03 0.31
Full Time 0.001 0.005 0.26 0.005 0.005 1.09 0.81
White Collar 0.017 0.005 3.71 0.005 0.005 0.86 0.20
Market Potential Experience 0.177 0.095 1.85 0.093 0.107 0.87 27.34
Tenure -0.040 0.063 -0.63 -0.095 0.078 -1.22 5.85
(Log) Daily Wage 0.000 0.006 0.03 0.005 0.007 0.69 4.17
South -0.003 0.006 -0.56 -0.005 0.007 -0.74 0.47
(Log) Size -0.038 0.014 -2.72 -0.015 0.016 -0.94 2.02
Age Last Firm (Years) -.116 .130 -0.89 -.122 .137 -0.89 14.269
Note: The table reports results for the robustness tests described in Section 1.6.4. The analysis based on 249,581 spells of
individuals laid off from a permanent contract between 2009 and 2012. λ>500 and θ>500 are OLS coefficients from specifications
1.27 and 1.28, respectively. Columns from (1) to (3) report RDD coefficient for dicontinuity of observables at cutoff for whole
sample together with standard error and associated t-stat. Columns from (4) to (6) replicates same exercise for sample excluding
manipulation region. In both cases, the specification includes a dummy equal to 1 if the worker is fired after turning 50 years of
age, a squared polynomial in age in difference from the cutoff and flexible on the two sides. T-stats are bold if coefficients are
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Baseline reports average for the individuals fired between 49 and 50 years of age.
Standard Errors clustered at local labour market level.
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Table 1.7: Difference in observables between manipulators and other groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Manipulators Non Manipulators Difference (1)-(2) Baseline Group Difference (1)-(4)
Female 0.450 0.270 0.180 0.306 0.144
[0.100; 0.281] [0.078; 0.206]
White Collar 0.351 0.180 0.170 0.199 0.152
[0.101;0.239] [0.094; 0.208]
Full Time 0.754 0.822 -0.067 0.806 -0.052
[-0.134; -0.000] [-0.106; 0.004]
Tenure 6.577 5.718 0.859 5.933 0.644
[-0.142; 1.853] [-0.166; 1.449]
Log Daily Wage 4.115 4.176 -0.0610 4.168 -0.053
[-0.142; 0.023] [-0.120; 0.015]
South 0.483 0.471 0.012 0.469 0.014
[-0.072; 0.098] [-0.056; 0.083]
(Log) Size 1.862 2.258 -0.395 2.207 -0.345
[-0.640; -0.155] [-0.546; -0.148]
Age firm (years) 14.546 14.335 0.211 14.482 0.064
[-1.945; 2.320] [-1.647; 1.780]
Note: The table reports differences in observable characteristics between manipulators and non-manipulators. The analysis is based
on 249,581 spells of individuals laid off from a permanent contract between 2009 and 2012. Column (1) reports estimated means of
manipulators’ characteristics; column (2) does the same for non-manipulators; Column (4) reports estimated means for baseline group,
defined as the set of individuals we would have observed in the missing region, in absence of manipulation. Columns (3) and (5) report
the difference between these groups. Bootstrapped confidence interval at 95% are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.8: Testing for discontinuities in the layoff density at the threshold
(1) (2) (3)
Whole sample Without manipulation Without manipulation
region region
(alternative definition)
Age -0.0366*** -0.0335*** -0.0319***
(0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0026)
I[age ≥ 50] × Age -0.0000 0.00029 0.0002
(0.0042) (0.0032) (0.0033)
I[age ≥ 50] 0.0270** 0.0100 0.0015
(0.0105) (0.0075) (0.0079)
Observations 208 203 195
R-squared 0.866 0.898 0.9040
Mean .48 .48 .48
Note: The table reports a parametric test for the discontinuity in the density of layoff at the cutoff
of 50 years of age. Column (1) includes all bins. Column (2) excludes the manipulation region which
encompasses the three bins before the cutoff and the two bins after the cutoff. Column (3) also excludes
the manipulation region but uses an alternative definition of such region. Details about the alternative
definition are provided in Section 1.6.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Appendices
1.A Further details about Italian UI
1.A.1 Other UI benefit schemes active in Italy from 2009-2012
During the years from 2009 to 2012 two other main UI schemes were in place: the Reduced
Unemployment Benefits (RUB) and the Mobility Indemnity (MI).25
On the one hand, the RUB was directed to workers who would have been eligible for OUB,
except for contribution requirements. While still requiring the first contribution to social security
to have happened two years before, the RUB scheme only required 13 weeks (78 days) worked
in the last year, instead of 52. Potential benefit duration was proportional to the days worked
in the previous year (up to 180 days), while the replacement rate granted 35% of the average
wage earned in the previous year for the first 120 days and 40% for the following 60 days. This
measure was substantially less generous than OUB. As a consequence, had workers met OUB
requirements, they would have chosen the former. 26
On the other hand, MI was active until 2017 and was targeted to workers fired during mass
layoffs or business reorganizations. This measure combined a long and generous income support
with active labor market policies, with an eye at improving workers’ occupational perspectives.
During the period under study the potential duration of this scheme depended on the worker’s
age at layoff and the geographical area where she worked, with a maximum PBD of 48 months
in southern regions and of 36 months in northern regions. The benefit amounted to 80% of the
salary for the first 12 months (with a cap annually set by law) and 64% during the following
months.
This measure represents a particularly attractive alternative for individuals involved in mass
layoffs and could lead to underrepresentation of these types of workers in our sample. What is
25Indennità di Disoccupazione Ordinaria a Requisiti Ridotti and Indennità di Mobilità in Italian,
respectively.
26For additional information, please refer to Anastasia et al. [2009].
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more relevant for our purposes is that selection for this benefit is mostly beyond the control of
the worker: indeed, the firm needed to be undergoing significant economic restructuring and
have a minimum size, while workers needed to meet some tenure requirements.
1.A.2 Other UI benefit schemes active in Italy after 2012
The Italian welfare system underwent several reforms after 2012, which aimed reducing the
fragmentation of benefits. In January 2013, both the OUB and the RUB were replaced
respectively by the ASpI and MiniASpI.27 On the one hand, the ASpI mimicked many aspects
of the OUB both in terms of requirements and in terms of structure of the benefit. In order to
be eligible for the benefit, the worker had to have contributed for the first time to social security
at least two years before the start of the unemployment spell and needed to have cumulated at
least one year of work in the previous two years. Similarly to the OUB, the worker was eligible
to eight months of benefit if she was fired before turning fifty while she was eligible to twelve
months if the worker was fired after turning fifty years of age. The duration of the benefit was
later modified on several occasions in 2014 and 2015, which makes it more difficult to use it for
our analysis. The amount of the benefit was proportional to wages in the last two years and the
worker received 75% of the average reference wage for the first six months and the amount was
reduced by 15 percentage points every six months (up to 45% after one year). On the other
hand, the MiniASpI was aimed at workers who did not meet the requirement for the ASpI, but
had cumulated at least thirteen weeks of work in the last year. Potential benefit duration was
equal to half of the weeks worked in the last year. Benefit receipt was proportional to past
wages: workers received 75% of the average wage received during the two previous years.
Following April 2015, both measures were replaced by a unique UI scheme which provided a
homogeneous coverage to workers in case of layoff. The new benefit, the NASpI, was mostly
based on the structure of the MiniASpI. Workers were eligible to the benefit if they had worked
for at least 78 days in the year before the layoff. Potential benefit duration was equal to half of
the weeks worked in the past 4 years. The benefit amount was proportional to past average
wages with a decreasing schedule. More specifically, the worker was eligible to receive 75% of
the average wage in the past four years and the amount was reduced by 3 percentage points for
every month after the first four. This new scheme created greater harmonization within the UI
system and provided uniform coverage to workers previously eligible to different programs. In
addition, it removed discontinuities in potential benefit duration, thus removing incentives for
workers to delay their layoff.
27Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego in Italian.
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Chapter 2
The impact of Chinese import competition on
Italian manufacturing
Luca Citino
Bank of Italy and London School of Economics
Andrea Linarello
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Abstract
This paper documents the effects of increased import competition from China on the Italian
labor market. In line with recent studies [Autor et al., 2013, 2014], we take two complementary
approaches and study both the effects on local labor markets and on incumbent manufacturing
workers. Our analysis shows that the Italian local labor markets which were more exposed to
Chinese trade by means of their industry composition ended up suffering larger manufacturing
and overall employment losses. Nevertheless, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that
the aggregate effect on total manufacturing employment is modest. At the individual level,
contrary to what has been documented for many developed countries, more exposed incumbent
manufacturing workers did not suffer long term losses in terms of lower earnings or more
discontinuous careers. While they were less likely than other similar manufacturing workers to
continue working at their initial employer, they were also able to carry out successful transitions
towards the non-tradable sector, in areas with better job opportunities.
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2.1 Introduction
China’s economic growth in the last 30 years has been unprecedented. Thanks to a series of
market-oriented reforms started in the late 70s, and culminated with the WTO accession in
2001, it came to be the third largest world economy and biggest manufacturing producer. In
recent years, a growing literature has quantified the effect that such an economic rise has had
on the labour markets of developed economies, mostly via international trade (see Autor et al.
[2016] for a review). While a robust finding from this line of work is that the “China shock" has
displaced manufacturing jobs and deteriorated the careers of incumbent manufacturing workers,
the margins of adjustment and the workers’ transitions towards other parts of the economy seem
to be country specific.
In this paper we investigate the impact of increased Chinese import competition, during the
1991-2007 period, on the Italian labor market. Our analysis takes two complementary approaches.
In the first part of the paper we make use of Italian Census data to look at the effects of Chinese
trade from the perspective of local labor markets (LLMs). Here we follow the methodology used
by Autor et al. [2013] and investigate whether areas specialized in industries subsequently hit by
Chinese competition lost more manufacturing jobs in the 1990s and 2000s. In the second part of
the paper we take advantage of administrative matched employer-employee data on individual
working histories to examine the careers of incumbent manufacturing workers, similarly to
Autor et al. [2014]. We ask whether those individuals who in 1991 were working in industries
subsequently hit by Chinese competition were more likely to lose their job in the following years
and, if so, whether they were able to carry out successful job transitions towards other firms.
We find that LLMs traditionally specialized in import-competing sectors see a decrease in
manufacturing and overall employment. On aggregate, however, this fall is modest in size. If we
compare the evolution of the share of working-age population employed in manufacturing over the
period 2001-2007 of two areas respectively at the 75th and at the 25th percentile of our import
competition measure, we see that the former experiences a differential decrease of about 0.6
percentage points, a 5.3% fall in relative terms. Under the assumption that relative differences
across areas represent absolute changes in employment, a back-of-the-envelope calculation, first
developed in Autor et al. [2013], reveals that the “China shock" would have displaced around
24,000 jobs during the 1991-2001 period and 119,000 jobs during the 2001-2007 period. While
China can account for about half of the overall decline (280,000 jobs), these figures are very
modest if one considers that the number of individuals employed in manufacturing stood at 5.1
million in 1991.1
1Authors’ calculations based on the 1991 Istat Census.
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A decomposition of the overall impact into industry-level effects, developed in Goldsmith-
Pinkham et al. [2018], reveals that negative employment changes are mainly driven by the
textile and clothing sectors, inclusive of footwear. At the same time, Italy remained relatively
shielded from the rising import competition in consumer electronics and integrated circuits that
characterized the United States over the same period [Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018, Bloom
et al., 2019].
Interestingly, we also find that incumbent workers employed in more exposed manufacturing
industries did not face more discontinuous careers, nor earned less than other similar individuals
when in work. While they were more likely to terminate their work relationship at their initial
employer, they were also more likely to carry out successful transitions. Workers predominantly
moved towards the non-tradable sector and, in particular, towards unskilled labor intensive
industries.2 In addition, we document that part of these job moves can be explained by increases
in geographical mobility. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to find a response along
this margin. These effects are almost entirely driven by workers with high wages and employed
in bigger firms.
Overall our results suggests that while the rise of China has certainly implied concentrated
employment losses in some local labor markets, this was not enough to cause an overall decline in
manufacturing employment in Italy. As a matter of fact, even though the manufacturing share
of employment has witnessed a steady decline during the last fifteen years, Italy has experienced
only a limited fall in the absolute number of people working in manufacturing, compared to
other developed countries (see Figure 2.1). Moreover, workers’ transitions out of manufacturing
were helped by sustained employment growth in the non-tradable sector, which characterized
Italy during those years. While the manufacturing employment share of working-age population
has decreased by 1.4 p.p. during the 1991-2007 period, the non-tradable share went up by
9.0 p.p., leading to an overall rise of the employment rate of 7.6 p.p..3 Correspondingly, the
unemployment rate has been on a declining path from the late 1990s until the onset of the Great
Recession, reaching 6% in 2007.4 All in all, the “China shock" seems to have hit in a moment of
favorable labor market conditions, when it would have been relatively easy for workers to find
alternative job opportunities outside of manufacturing.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on the effects of Chinese import competition on
the labor markets of developed economies. At an aggregate level, all existing studies document
negative employment effects. However, some important differences emerge in terms of size.
2In order to classify non-tradable industries we employ the Eurostat “knowledge-intensive" definition.
3Authors’ calculations based on IStat Census data and Italian Statistical Register of Active Enter-
prises.
4IStat [2019]
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In Spain, Donoso et al. [2015] find employment effects much larger than Autor et al. [2013]
found in their seminal paper on the US. They rationalize this with the presence of labor market
rigidities that do not allow wages to respond to trade shocks. To the contrary Balsvik et al.
[2015] find muted effects of Chinese competition in Norway, with job destruction being limited
to few thousands units. For France, Malgouyres [2017] also finds smaller effects compared to the
US, although bigger than in Norway. A peculiar case is represented by Germany. Dauth et al.
[2014] find that while areas specialized in import-competing industries lost employment, this
was more than compensated by gains in areas specialized in export-oriented industries. The
latter led to a net gain of approximately 300,000 jobs that would not have otherwise arisen. For
the Italian case, our results document that the China shock had only modest aggregate effects
on manufacturing jobs. In Portugal Cabral et al. [2018] and Branstetter et al. [2019] find muted
effects on the domestic market, but strong effects on export markets. Previous literature on the
Italian case has pointed out that industries hit by import competition from low-wage countries
lost employment compared to other manufacturing industries and that this is especially true in
low-skill and labor intensive industries [Federico, 2014]. In our paper, we are able extend the
analysis and to look at the local labor market and the individual level margins of adjustment to
trade shocks.
At the individual level, the general consensus so far reached is that the “China shock" has
adverse consequences on workers’ careers, mostly due to the partial inability of transferring
industry-specific skills to other sectors. For the US Autor et al. [2014] find negative effects on
earnings, but not on the number of years with positive earnings. While workers of all skill levels
are equally likely to separate from their initial employer, low-skilled workers are the hardest hit,
because they keep churning among exposed industries and find it hard to transition to services.
Higher-skilled workers, instead, are able to move out of manufacturing, with no apparent earning
loss. Qualitatively similar results have also been found for Germany [Dauth et al., 2018] and
Denmark [Utar, 2018], where the service sector can account for the majority of the transitions
towards new employers. In contrast to the previous papers, we find that displaced workers were
able to complete successful job transitions, thanks to the favourable labor market conditions,
because new jobs were created in industries whose skill requirements were close enough to those
needed in their previous jobs. This has mitigated the otherwise negative impact of increased
international competition on the time spent in employment as well as on cumulative earnings.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2.2 we describe our data sources. In Section 2.3
we describe how we construct our measure of import exposure and detail our IV strategy. In
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 we report our analyses at the local labour market and individual level,
respectively. In Section 2.6 we conclude.
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2.2 Data and Measurement
For the purpose of this study we combine data from different sources. International trade data
comes from UN Comtrade and Eurostat. The former contains import flows at the product
level classified at the 6-digit HS level, for over 170 countries, starting from 1991. Since Italian
data is not present for 1991 in Comtrade, we integrate it with data from Eurostat. We convert
ECU-valued trade flows from Eurostat into dollars using the average nominal ECU/$ exchange
rate for 1991. We also deflate all import values so that they are expressed in 2007 dollars at
constant prices. We aggregate product-level data to the level of 4-digit ISIC rev. 3 industries,
using the concordances provided by Eurostat-RAMON. Domestic production data, needed to
construct import penetration measures at the 4-digit level, comes from the Unido-INDSTAT4
database. In the remainder of the paper the term “industry" refers to 4-digit classifications and
the term “sector" to 2-digit classifications.
Chinas’s share of world exports in goods soared from 2% in 1990 to about 15% in 2015. As
for Italy, real imports from China have also been rising during the whole period. In 1991 Italy
imported goods from China for a total value $3.1 billion. The same figure was around $28.1
billion in 2007, a 800% real increase. Over the same period, overall imports grew by a factor of
170%. An important feature of this exceptional growth is the high degree of variation across
sectors. Table 2.1 reports 1991-2007 changes in the import penetration ratio and employment
shares in total manufacturing employment for 22 2-digit sectors. The greatest incraese in
import penetration occurred in sectors linked to textile and furniture, while industries that
experienced the lowest increases are in the food and beverage sectors. The three most exposed
sectors constituted 19.1% of the total manufacturing employment in 1991, indicating that Italy
was relatively specialized in those sectors subsequently hit by Chinese competition.5 In 2007,
the same three 2-digit sectors accounted for 15.8% of total manufacturing employment, which
approximately corresponds to a 1/5 decrease.
In the regional analysis our unit of interest is the local labor market (LLM). We obtain
information on LLMs from the National Institute of Statistics (Istat). LLMs are groups of
municipalities with strong commuting ties, and are similar to commuting zones in the US.6 In
1991, Istat grouped Italy’s 8,101 municipalities in 784 local labor markets. For each LLM we
collect employment data by industry in 1981, 1991 and 2001 from the manufacturing census
and in 2007 from the Italian Statistical Register of Active Enterprises (ASIA). In order to
match industry employment data to international trade data, we convert all employment-related
5If there was no correlation between import exposure and initial specialization we would expect that
the first three sectors occupy (100/22)× 3× 100 = 13.6% of total manufacturing employment.
6For more details about the methodology, see ISTAT. [1997] and Coppola and Mazzotta [2005]
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variables from the original NACE classification to the ISIC Rev. 3 classification up to the level
of 4 digits. In order to construct demographic and socio-economic control variables at the LLM
level in 1991 and 2001, we draw information from the Population Census at the municipality
level. We report descriptive statistics in Table 2.2, panel (a). Similarly to other developed
economies, manufacturing employment as a share of working age population has been declining
in the last two decades. However, a strong growth in the non-tradable sector has lead the overall
employment rate to rise markedly, more than in other OECD countries.
In the worker-level analysis, our units of interest are the incumbent employees of manufacturing
firms in 1991. We draw information on their career before and after 1991, and up to 2007 from
the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS). We rely on a matched employer-employee dataset
covering the universe of workers from the population of privately employed individuals in Italy.
Public sector, farming and self-employment are not present in the dataset. For each job spell
in every year we observe worker and firm identifiers, together with gross earnings, number of
weeks worked in full time equivalent units, part-time status and a coarse occupational code
(apprentice, blue collar, high-skilled blue collar, white collar, middle manager or manager). For
each worker we also observe a series of basic demographic characteristics such as gender, year
of birth and place of birth. As for their firms, we observe 4-digit industries and municipality
for each establishment.7 We select a sample of approximately 700,000 workers born between
1952 and 1970, who were between 21 and 55 years old during the 1992-2007 period. We exclude
individuals born in earlier cohorts because industry specific retirement patterns may act as
a confounder. We restrict our attention to workers with high labor market attachment, who
had a year-round job in the manufacturing sector in 1991, but were also employed the whole
time in the three years before. In Table 2.2, panel (b), we display descriptive statistics. Out of
the 192 months between 1991 and 2007, the average worker spent 157 months in employment,
cumulatively earned 15 times her initial average annual salary, displaying a wage growth of
14% of her initial average annual salary for every 12 months spent in employment. One-third
of our sample is made of females, while 70% is made of blue collar workers. Only 2% of these
individuals were born abroad. In the years from 1988 to 1991, the average worker was earning a
mean salary of exp{10.6} ≈ 23, 000 euros and experienced a wage growth of around 9%.
7Our definition of an establishment is based on the matricola contributiva in the INPS dataset, that
is the level at which firms pay social security contributions. For a given firm a matricola includes a set
workers whose activities can be attributed to a unique 4-digit industry, and the set has organizational
and managerial autonomy.
61
2.3 Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy closely follows recent work by Autor et al. [2016]. We exploit variation in
the growth of Italian imports from China across narrowly defined manufacturing industries. For
each industry j our measure of the increase in exposure to Chinese competition is the change in
the import penetration ratio:
∆IP ITAjt =
∆M ITAjt
Yj,91 +Mj,91 −Xj,91 , (2.1)
where ∆M ITAjt is the real change in Italian imports from China in industry j between period t
and t− 1; Yj,91 is domestic production in 1991; Mj,91 is total imports in 1991 and Xj,91 is total
exports in 1991. Import penetration captures the fraction of Italian domestic consumption (for
goods produced in j) accounted for by Chinese producers. It can also be seen as the market
share in sales that China occupies in the Italian market.
We use this measure in two different ways. In Section 2.4 we apportion industry-level changes
as in 2.1 to LLMs, depending on their initial employment shares in such industries. Our aim
there is to investigate how local exposure to import competition translates into declines of
manufacturing and overall employment at the local level. In Section 2.5, instead, we attribute
industry-level changes directly to individual workers, depending on their industry of affiliation
in 1991. There we are interested in studying the adverse consequences of international trade on
job biographies and explore the margins of adjustment that workers have to recover from an
increase in trade exposure.
One could be concerned that the measure in 2.1 is correlated with unobserved industry shocks
in Italy, which also explain employment dynamics. This would prevent identification by means
of simple OLS.8 In order to obviate to this issue we employ an instrumental variable strategy
aimed at isolating changes in Chinese trade that are due to productivity improvements in China,
rather than domestic industry shocks. Consistently with the recent literature [Acemoglu et al.,
2016, Autor et al., 2016, 2013, 2014] we instrument 2.1 with an analogous measure that replaces
changes in Chinese exports to Italy with changes in Chinese exports to other developed countries
(OC). This is equal to:
8Say that technological improvements in a given industry allows Italian firms to sell more goods at
lower prices. This could independently affect both Italian firms’ labor demand and consumer demand
for Chinese goods, biasing the OLS coefficient. The sign of the bias would depend on what exactly
happens to labor demand (which could increase or decrease following the technological improvement)
and to consumer demand for Chinese goods (which could decrease or increase depending on whether
the goods are substitute or complements).
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∆IPOCjt =
∆MOCjt
Yj,91 +Mj,91 −Xj,91 (2.2)
The intuition behind the relevance of this instrument is that a series of structural reforms in
China have increased its productive capacity in a specific set of industries where the economy
had a comparative advantage. As a consequence China started exporting more in these industries
across a wide variety of destinations. In order for this instrument to be valid, it must be that
common patterns in Chinese trade across developed economies do not reflect correlated demand
or technology shocks across high income countries. Although we cannot rule out this completely
we choose our set of high-income countries so that this risk is minimized. We select all countries
used in Autor et al. [2013], with the inclusion of the US, but exclude European countries, where
Italian exports and trade flows are concentrated. Our countries include therefore: The United
States, Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand. Import flows that are common between Italy
and this set of countries is more likely to capture the common Chinese supply-side component
rather than a correlated demand component.
2.4 Local labor market evidence
Our aim in this section is to understand the relationship between changes in import competition
from China and changes in manufacturing employment, which we measure as the share of
working age population employed in manufacturing, at the local labor market level. Our
empirical strategy, first developed in Autor et al. [2013], uses a Bartik-type measure where
nation-wide industry changes in import penetration are apportioned to LLMs via initial local
employment shares in those industries. The design exploits variation in the initial specialization
of LLMs to generate variation in exposure to Chinese competition. Our measure of exposure is:
∆IP ITAit =
∑
j
Lij,1991
Li,1991
∆IP ITAjt , (2.3)
where ∆IP ITAjt is the change in import penetration between period t and t − 1 for industry
j. Lij,1991 is employment in industry j in LLM i in 1991, while Li,1991 is total private non-
agricultural employment in LLM i in 1991. The cross-sectional variation in ∆IP ITAit comes
from two sources: (a) differences in the initial manufacturing share of employment9 and, (b)
differences in the industry mix within manufacturing. In our preferred specification we always
9Imports from China consist almost exclusively of manufacturing goods. Given this fact, consider
a situation where ∆IPjt is constant and equal to k for every industry j in the manufacturing sector.
Then ∆IPit = k · Lmi,1991/Li,1991, where Lmi,1991 is total manufacturing employment. It follows that the
shock is higher by contruction in those LLMs with higher employment share in manufacturing in 1991.
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control for the share of manufacturing employment in 1991, so that the cross-sectional variation
only comes from differences in industrial composition across areas with similar manufacturing
intensity. By means of their initial specialization, some LLMs experienced marked increases in
import penetrations while others remained relatively shielded from it. Two LLMs at the 25th
and 75th percentile of import exposure, experienced a differential change in import penetration
from China of 0.64 percentage points during the 1991-2001 period, and of 2.7 percentage points
during the 2001-2007 period.
In Figure 2.2 we present heatmaps of both changes in the share of working-age population
employed in manufacturing and changes in the import penetration ratio, for the 2001-2007
period. Both changes are first residualized against the start-of-period share of manufacturing
employment. The hardest-hit areas are concentrated in the North-East (Veneto) and Center
(Tuscany and Marche). In the North-West (Piemonte) and vast part of the South (Campania,
Molise, Basilicata), competition was lower. We now turn to our estimating equation:
∆Yit = αr + γt + β∆IP ITAit +X ′i,′91δ + it, (2.4)
where our main outcome of interest is the change in the share of working-age individuals who
work in manufacturing; αr are 20 “NUTS 2" region fixed effects; X ′i,′91 is a vector of LLM-level
controls measured in 1991, namely the female employment rate and the share of manufacturing
employment in private non-farm employment; it is an error term.10 We estimate Equation 2.4
in long differences, stacking the two periods 1991-2001 and 2001-2007. We normalize variables
to decade-equivalent changes11, and include a decade dummy (γt). All regressions are weighted
by initial LLM share of working age population. We cluster standard errors at the LLM level
to account for serially correlated shocks over time within areas. The differenced specifications
net out unobservable time-invariant characteristics at the LLM level, which explain the level of
manufacturing employment. Our specification in long differences measures long-run changes and
should not be affected by year-to-year volatility in manufacturing employment or trade flows.
As described in Section 2.3, one possible concern when estimating Equation 2.4 by OLS, is that
∆IP ITAit could be correlated with the error term because of domestic industry-specific shocks.
In order to obviate to these problems we instrument our measure in 2.3 with:
10Contrary to Autor et al. [2013], we do not have good measures of education and the incidence of
routine occupations at the local level. These controls are aimed at capturing changes in technology
that may be correlated with import exposure and explain the evolution of manufacturing employment.
To obviate to this lack of measurement we try to control for these factors indirectly, by using (twenty)
region fixed effects, under the assumption that these characteristics do not vary extensively across local
labor markets in the same region.
11This involves multiplying both the dependent variable and ∆IP by 10/6 in the second period
(2001-2007).
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∆IPOCit =
∑
j
Lij,1991
Li,1991
∆IPOCjt , (2.5)
that is an analogous measure that replaces changes in Chinese exports to Italy with changes in
Chinese exports to a subset of other developed countries (OC). In the next section we present
the results from our analysis.
2.4.1 Chinese trade and manufacturing employment
Table 2.3 presents the main results of the local labor market analysis. In Panel (a) we report 2SLS
estimates of the effect of Chinese import competition on the manufacturing share. Corresponding
first-stage estimates and K-P F-statistics are displayed in Panel (b).12 In all specifications
we detect a negative and strongly significant effect of increases in import competition on the
manufacturing share. The coefficient associated with the ∆IP ITAit variable in column (1) of
panel (a) indicates that, over a decade, a percentage-point increase in import penetration
from China is associated with a 0.253 percentage points decline in the share of working age
individuals working in manufacturing.13 In column (2) we introduce 20 regional dummies, meant
to capture unobserved differential trends in employment dynamics. During this period, the
manufacturing share in working age population was growing more in the South of Italy compared
to the North, mostly because of increases in labor force participation, traditionally low in the
South. The introduction of geographic dummies partially attenuates the size of our effect of
interest, which still remains strong and significant. Compared to specification in column (2),
column (3) further adds to the analysis demographic and economic controls measured in 1991,
which may independently affect the manufacturing share at the LLM level. Both the share
of manufacturing employment and the female employment share are strong predictors of the
decline in manufacturing. However the coefficient on our variable of interest decreases only by
1/4 compared to column (2) and remains highly significant. Finally, in column (4) we estimate
our model with the full set of controls but without weighting for working age population in the
LLM at the beginning of the period. The main results are unaffected, suggesting the results
are not driven by a few and very large LLMs. First stage estimates suggest a very strong and
statistically significant relationship between our endogenous variable and the instrument. First
stage estimates are very stable across specifications.
Column (3) is our preferred specification. Our coefficient of interest indicates that, over a
decade, a percentage point increase in the share of domestic spending that falls on Chinese goods
12Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix reports OLS estimates of the same specifications.
13The level of the share in 1991 was 11.66%, so this implies a 1.7% change.
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lowers the share of working age individuals employed in manufacturing by 0.146 percentage
points. Under the assumption that differences across LLMs mainly reflect absolute changes in
the number of jobs, we can use a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation to assess the relative
contribution of China in explaining changes in manufacturing employment [Autor et al., 2013].14
Since the average local labor market saw a real increase in Chinese import penetration of 0.7
percentage points between 1991 and 2001, and of 3.5 percentage points in the six years between
2001 and 2007, we obtain that Chinese import competition has reduced the manufacturing share
in working age population by 0.1 (0.146 × 0.7) percentage points in the first period and 0.51
(0.146 × 3.5) percentage points in the second period. Since the overall change in such share
has been -0.55 percentage points in the first period, and -0.89 percentage points in the second
period, we obtain that China can account for 18% (0.1 over 0.55) of such decrease in the first
period, and 58% (0.51 over 0.89) in the second period.
As highlighted in Autor et al. [2013], this benchmarking exercise may overstate the share of
the decline that is attributable to China. While βˆ2SLS reflects the causal effect of an increase
in China’s productive capacity on Italian manufacturing, ∆IP ITAit reflects both supply and
demand changes. Insofar increases in import demand by Italian consumers have less negative
effects on employment, our calculation would overstate China’s contribution to the decline in
Italian manufacturing. Same as in their paper, we rescale the effects multiplying them by the
share of variance in ∆IP ITAit accounted for by ∆IPOCit .15 We find this share to be 61% in our
sample. This implies that China can account for 11% of the Italian manufacturing decline in the
1991-2001 period and for 35% of the decline in the 2001-2007 period. Multiplying these shares
by 1991 working age population would imply a loss of around 23,700 jobs in the first period and
a loss of 119,400 jobs in the second period. In Table 2.A.3 we compare these numbers to those
constructed for other OECD countries in similar studies. In Italy, France, Germany and Norway,
the number of jobs lost represents between 1% and 4% of 1995 manufacturing employment,
reflecting a striking similarity in the magnitude of the response. In Spain and the United States
the picture looks much different, with declines of almost 14% and 9% respectively.
To check the robustness of our results we perform a series of falsification tests, where we regress
1981-1991 (past) changes in manufacturing employment against 1991-2001 and 2007-2001 (future)
changes in import penetration, properly instrumented. This amounts to check whether areas
subsequently hit by Chinese competition were already trending differently in the decade before.
In Table 2.4 we show the results. While in some instances the absolute value of point estimates
is greater than that of our main effects, we fail to find any statistically significant relationship
14Migration across areas constitutes one potential threat to the validity of this exercise. In Section
2.4.2 we show that population counts do not respond to the China shock.
15The details of this calculation are presented in the Theory Appendix of Autor et al. [2013]
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between past employment dynamics and Chinese trade. Areas later hit by Chinese competition
were not on a significantly different trend beforehand.
2.4.2 Other labour market outcomes at the local level
Following a shock to labor demand in manufacturing, incumbent workers losing their job may
choose to reallocate to the non-manufacturing sector, to move to other local labor markets or to
abandon the labor force altogether.
The indirect effects of trade with China on employment in other sectors may be ambiguous in
sign. On the one hand incumbent workers exiting manufacturing may turn to the non-tradable
sector looking for a job. Similarly, new entrants may face fewer vacancies in manufacturing
and search for a job elsewhere. This reallocation channel predicts that bigger decreases in the
share of manufacturing employment should cause an increase in the share of non-manufacturing
employment, with no net effect on total employment. On the other hand if workers are not
able to obtain other jobs in the non-tradable sector, they may decide to leave the labor force
(depressing total employment) or migrate to other local labor markets, inducing changes in
population. This may happen both because industry specific human capital prevents transitions
across sectors, or because the negative demand shock induced by China may dampen the local
demand for non-tradables, reducing labor demand.
We use slight modifications of the estimating equation in 2.4 to shed light on these different
adjustment mechanisms. In Table 2.5 we study three different outcomes: the number of people
employed in the non-tradable sector over working age (15-64) population, the total number
of people working over working age population and, finally the log change in working age
population. Results in Table 2.5 suggest that in those LLMs that were more exposed to Chinese
trade, the decline in manufacturing employent (column 1) was not compensated by an increase
in employment in the non-tradable sectors (column 2). Given that working age population did
not change in response to increased competition (column 4) total employment in those LLMs
fell (column 3).
2.4.3 Why are effects small?
Compared to results found for the United States, our point estimates, combined with aggregate
measures of the shock, indicate at most modest effects of Chinese import competition on Italian
aggregate employment. Under the assumption that cross-sectional differences reflect absolute
changes, China would have caused Italian manufacturing employment to decline by 3% over the
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1995-2007 period. The same change, as implied by estimates in Autor et al. [2013] is 8.9% in the
United States (Table 2.A.3). In this subsection we try to rationalize this finding and provide
some suggestive evidence that may explain the difference.
The first consideration to be made is that the industrial composition of Italy and the United
States looked very different already in the mid 1990s. The United States had higher employment
shares in high-tech sectors linked to computing and ICT, while Italy was specialized in lower-tech
sectors linked to textile and clothing (T&C), together with leather goods. In 1995, Electrical
machinery and optical equipment accounted for 14.4% of manufacturing employment in the US,
while the same number was only 6.8% in Italy. Conversely, in 1995 20% of Italian manufacturing
employment was accounted for by T&C and leather goods, while the same share was around
half of that in the United States (9.1%).16
The common view is that China exports low-tech goods that are intensive in the use of labor.
Given these specialization patterns this would have implied bigger employment losses in Italy,
compared to the United States. However, starting from the early 2000s, the structure of Chinese
exports changed in favour of consumer electronics and other relatively high-tech goods, in a
way that was not expected for a country with that level of development [Rodrik, 2006, Schott,
2008].17 The relative convenience of Chinese goods in these sectors has likely put competitive
pressure on US producers. While such higher-tech goods gained prevalence, it is still true
that China was exporting high quantities of T&C goods. However, empirical evidence using
European data shows that import competition in T&C has led to technology upgrading within,
and reallocation of workers towards, the best firms in the sector [Bloom et al., 2016]. One might
argue that such reallocation within T&C may have limited aggregate employment losses in
manufacturing. In addition to this, Italian varieties in T&C may have suffered less from Chinese
competition as they were already part of a higher-quality and relatively insulated market niche
[Truett and Truett, 2014].
In what follows we use techniques developed by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. [2018] to analyze
whether the local labor market effects in the two countries are indeed driven by different
industries. The authors show that the 2SLS estimator based on a Bartik instrument (like
ours) can be expressed as a weighted average of industry-specific marginal effects, where the
weights depend on the relative strength of industry-specific first stages.18 In our setting, these
16We retrieve aggregate data for the US from the County Business Pattern files for 1995, freely available
at https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/1995/econ/cbp/1995-cpb.html. For T&C (including
leather) we consider 2-digit SIC codes 22, 23, 31. For Electrical machinery and optical equipment, we
consider 3-digit SIC code 357 and 2-digit codes 36, 38.
17One emblematic case in this respect is Lenovo’s acquisition of the IBM PC division in december
2004.
18These weights are referred to as Rotemberg weights [Rotemberg, 1983]. Although the weights always
sum to one, negative weights are possible. This happens when the first stage coefficient associated to
one industry and the overall one are opposite in sign. In our sample, as in Autor et al. [2013], negative
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industry-specific weights depend on the (relative) strength with which Italian imports from
China in an industry can be explained by the Chinese supply shock, as captured by Chinese
exports to other countries.
In order to perform this exercise for the United States we make use of data from the replication
packages of Autor et al. [2013] and Acemoglu et al. [2016].19 Results are reported in Table 2.6.
In Panel (a) we report the top five industries in terms of industry-specific weights (αk) for the
United States, together with the associated marginal effects (βk). Electronic computers and
semiconductors strongly contribute to the overall decline. The importance of such industries is
also consistent with recent evidence from Bloom et al. [2019], who find that most of China-related
employment changes in the US are driven by large multinationals in high-tech sectors switching
from manufacturing activities (probably offshored) to service activities. We also find negative
effects in furniture and toys, consistent with fast and marked increases in import penetration.20
Perhaps surprisingly, communication equipment (radio and TV) did not witness employment
changes, despite strong import competition. When turning to Panel (b), we find a very different
set of industries driving effects in Italy. We find that import changes in the textile and clothing
(T&C) sector are associated with employment declines and none of the high-tech sectors rank
among the top five. The industry that carries the highest weight is the cutting and shaping of
stone. While in this industry Chinese imports rose substantially, this did not cause a fall in
employment. This is likely due to strong foreign demand of certain Italian stone varieties (e.g.
marble sold to China) that prevented labor demand from falling.21 These results confirm the
effects are driven by different industries in the two countries, consistent with the evidence from
the literature presented in this subsection.
weights are quantitatively unimportant.
19In order to harmonize the import competition measure across the two settings, we substitute the
original import per worker measure employed in Autor et al. [2013] with an import penetration one, built
thanks to data from Acemoglu et al. [2016]. Acemoglu et al. [2016] uses two time windows, 1991-1999
and 1999-2007 that are slightly different from Autor et al. [2013] and ours. We therefore appropriately
rescale these 8-year long differences so that they reflect decade-equivalent changes. Industry employment
shares are always fixed at 1988.
20Reporters from the Wall Street Journal have also been arguing that the rise in import competition
from China can account for consistent employment declines in the furniture industry [Davis and
Hilsenrath, 2016]
21The inclusion of the stone-cutting industry is not the only factor responsible for the difference
in effects. When repeating the analysis removing such industry, we find a βˆ2SLS = −0.315. The
ensuing back-of-envelope calculation of Section 2.4.1 yields an overall loss of 255,000 manufacturing
jobs, amounting to 5.5% of 1995 manufacturing employment, which is still lower than the effect found
by Autor et al. [2013] for the US.
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2.5 Worker level evidence
Although Chinese import competition has a negative impact on the share of population that
works in manufacturing, individual careers of incumbent workers need not to be negatively
affected. Worker-level effects may be muted if individuals are able to absorb the initial trade
shock by transitioning to different firms, sectors or even local labor markets. Focusing on workers
allows us to study such individual margins of adjustment and assess their magnitude.
In this section we thus take a complementary approach to the previous one and analyze the
career developments of individuals initially employed in industries which saw increases in Chinese
competition over the 1992-2007 period. We take a long-run view and look at cumulative outcomes
related to the time spent employed and earnings, as in Autor et al. [2014]. Similarly to them,
after assessing the overall impact of Chinese trade on careers we decompose outcomes according
to where they are accrued: initial employer, other employers, initial 2-digit manufacturing sector,
other 2-digit manufacturing sectors, the non-tradable sector, initial local labor market or other
local labor markets. We compare individuals who are observationally similar in 1991, except
for their narrow industry affiliation. In doing so, we control not only for observable individual
characteristics, but also characteristics of the firm and sector where these workers were employed
at the time. For identification we use variation within broad manufacturing sub-sectors and
within local labor markets.
We attribute 1991-2007 changes in import penetration to each worker based on the 4-digit
industry of their employer in 1991. When a worker has more than one job in 1991, we consider
the spell where the worker earns the highest share of income for that year. As highlighted in
Section 2.3, we instrument changes in the Chinese import penetration in Italy with changes in
Chinese import penetration for a selected set of high income countries. We attribute the value
of the instrument to each worker based on their industry affiliation in 1988, instead of 1991, to
exclude that our effects can be explained by job transitions in anticipation of Chinese trade.
Our empirical specification is very similar in spirit to Autor et al. [2014]. Our preferred
specification takes the form:
Yij = α+ β1∆IPjt + β2IPj,91 +X ′ijγ +X ′jδ + θk + ηs + ij , (2.6)
where Yij is the outcome of interest for worker i employed in 1991 in industryj, ∆IP is the
1991-2007 change in import penetration, IPj,91 is the level of import penetration for that same
industry in 1991. X ′ij is a vector of individual characteristics, all measured at the beginning of
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the period. This includes a dummy for being female, year of birth dummies, a dummy for being
foreign-born, dummies for the age of entry into the labour market, the log of average annual
earnings and log change in earnings between 1988 and 1991, a dummy for being a part-time
worker, and six dummies related coarse occupational codes.22 We also include firm level controls
measured at the main job the worker holds in 1991: the dimensional class of the firm and the
log of the average wage in the firm. X ′j is a vector of 4-digit industry characteristics. We include
the share of white collars workers in 1991, the change in the industry employment share between
1983 and 1991, and the log change in the industry average wage between 1983 and 1991. We
also use dummies for 14, broadly defined, manufacturing sub-sectors (θk) and local labor market
fixed effects (ηs). We cluster standard errors at the level of 1991 4-digit industry, to account for
the fact that the long-run outcomes are correlated for individuals initially employed at the same
firm, or in the same industry.
2.5.1 Import competition and individual careers
In Table 2.7 we present 2SLS estimates of equation 2.6 for different labor market outcomes
at the individual level. Regardless of the measure used, we fail to detect any economically
significant impact of Chinese import competition on individual careers. This stands in contrast
with previous work, which has systematically detected losses for the average exposed worker
[Autor et al., 2014, Utar, 2018, Dauth et al., 2018] Column (1) reports the estimated effect
of changes in Chinese import penetration on the cumulative number of months with at least
one day of employment. The coefficient is not significantly different from zero, and 95%
confidence intervals exclude any economically meaningful effects. The point estimate of 0.013
indicates that a 10 percentage-points increase in import penetration is associated with a 4-days
(0.013× 10× 365/12 = 3.95) increase in the time spent in employment over a 16-year period.23
While this indicates a null effect of Chinese trade along the extensive margin of employment,
it is not conclusive about the intensive margin. After a trade shock, workers could remain
employed but see their number of working weeks or hours reduced. In columns (2) and (3)
we investigate this channel by looking at the cumulative number of weeks and the number of
full-time-equivalent (FTE) weeks worked. Any difference in the effects on these two variables
should reflect a change in working hours. We find no negative effect along these margins. If
anything, we see a slight increase in the number of weeks worked, although the impact is very
small in size. A 10 percentage-point increase in import penetration is at most associated with a
22These are apprentice, blue collar, high-skilled blue collar, white collar, middle manager, manager.
23A 10 p.p. increase in import penetration is approximately the difference faced two workers employed
in industries at the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of import exposure, respectively (that is 10.7
p.p.)
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5 days (0.088× 10× 6 = 5.3) increase in time spent in employment, over a period of 16 years.24
In the next two columns we look at earnings-related measures. In column (4) we study
cumulative earnings normalized by average 1988-1991 yearly earnings, while in column (5) we
look at cumulative earnings per 12 months worked, always normalized by average initial earnings
(a proxy for wages).25 More exposed workers did not face any appreciable income loss compared
to observationally similar, but less exposed, individuals. As a consequence they did not face
lower wages conditional on working.26
The fact that the overall impact is not distinguishable from zero does not imply that more
exposed workers did not experience any change in their career. It could be that workers
experienced a negative shock at their initial employer but were able to adjust by finding job
opportunities at new firms, potentially in other sectors and other localities. In Table 2.8 we
unpack the total effects analyzed in Table 2.7 into a component observed at the initial employer
and a (complementary) component observed at other employers. For ease of exposition we only
report effects on the number of months worked, cumulative earnings and earnings per effective
year worked. In panel (a) we find that more exposed workers spend less time at their initial
employer (column (2)) but that such loss is entirely compensated by transitions towards other
firms (column (3)). This is reflected in cumulative earnings changes at the initial employer vs
other employers (panel (b)). Conditional on moving towards other firms, workers obtain slightly
higher earnings, compared to observationally similar workers who also move. The coefficient in
panel (c), column (3) indicates that a 10 p.p. increase in import penetration leads to an earning
growth 0.3% of average 1988-1991 yearly earnings every 12 months worked.
2.5.2 Where do workers find new job opportunities?
We have established that, on average, more exposed workers did not lose in terms of time spent
in employment or earnings, because of trade. Losses at the initial employer are compensated by
transitions towards other firms. In this subsection we investigate where these gains are accrued.
We look separately at sectoral mobility and geographical mobility. Similarly to Section 2.5.1, in
Table 2.9 decompose outcomes observed at new employers into a component that is accrued
within the initial sector and other ones accrued outside. Our estimates indicate that new job
opportunities are to be found in the non-tradable sector. More exposed workers spend less time
24Results are robust to the set of control variables included (see Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix).
25Compared to a specification with log earnings on the l.h.s. and individual fixed effects, such
normalization only uses of information on workers’ careers that is unaffected by the subsequent rise of
Chinese trade [Autor et al., 2014].
26The coefficient in column (4) implies that a 10 p.p. increase in import penetration causes a
cumulative earnings difference of 3% of average yearly earnings in 1988-1991. Given that the average
(gross) salary is around 23,300 euros, the coefficient implies a gain of 700 euros over 16 years
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working in their initial 2-digit sector and equally in other 2-digit sectors within manufacturing.
Results in panel (c) indicate modest earning growth (compared to the counterfactual) due to
transition towards the non-tradable sector.
The importance of the non-tradable sector sector in smoothing out trade shocks in manufacturing
is not new in the literature. However previous studies document either that these transitions
do not allow workers to fully counteract their initial shock, or that only a subset of them, the
high-skilled, is able change sector in a successful way [Autor et al., 2014, Utar, 2018, Dauth
et al., 2018, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2019]. We offer two sets of possible explanations for why
transitions to the non-tradable sector have been particularly successful for Italian manufacturing
workers. The first is that employment growth in non-tradables was strong, when compared to
other developed economies. For example, between 1991 and 2007, its employment share went
from 57% to 66% (+15.7%) in Italy and from 72% to 77% (+6.9%)in the US.27 [ILO, 2019].
Therefore, the sector as a whole could provide a high number of vacancies for workers leaving
manufacturing jobs. The second is that the skill content of the average job in non-tradables in
Italy was sufficiently low so that manufacturing workers could easily switch. As a consequence
manufacturing workers could more easily re-employ themselves in such sector. In Table 2.10
we separate non-tradable industries into “knowledge-intensive" (KIA) and “non-knowledge-
intensive", according to the Eurostat definition, and check which ones can account for most of
the transitions.28 As expected, non-KIA industries account for 100% of job transitions outside
of manufacturing that occur because of Chinese trade.
In Table 2.11 we investigate differential patterns of geographical mobility. Our results indicate
that exposed workers were more likely to spend more time outside of their initial LLM (panel (a),
column (3)), earning more as a consequence (panel (c), column (3)). For exposed workers, the
number of extra months worked in a different LLM (panel (a), column (3)) is lower in magnitude
than the number of extra months worked in the non-tradable sector found in Table 2.9. This
suggests that part of the new employment opportunities in the non-tradable sector are found
close to home, but a substantial component requires commuting to other local labor markets.
In Table 2.12 we further decompose geographical mobility responses according to whether they
occur within the same region or outside the initial region. We find that workers find new job
opportunities outside their region. These result stand in contrast with all previous worker-level
studies on the impact of Chinese trade, where no geographical mobility responses have been
found (see e.g. Autor et al. [2014], Dix-Carneiro and Kovak [2019]). This is also at odds with
another strand of literature that has highlighted the relatively weak relationship between labour
27This difference is exacerbated by the fact that, at the same time, the number of manufacturing jobs
was declining in the US and staying constant in Italy.
28A 2-digit sector is classified as “knowledge-intensive" if more than 1/3 of its employees have completed
tertiary education
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demand shocks and population in Italy [Ciani et al., 2019, among others]. The higher degree of
geographical mobility in Italy in response to the China shock thus constitutes a puzzle that we
aim to investigate in future research.
2.5.3 Heterogeneous responses in mobility patterns
In this section we investigate whether the mobility patterns so far investigated are heterogeneous
according to worker and firm characteristcs. We run models very similar to 2.6 but we interact
our import exposure measure with categorical variables of interest (and include category-specific
dummies).
In Table 2.13 we look at effects of import competition by workers’ initial wage level. We divide
workers into groups by using terciles of average 1988-1991 earnings, within age cohort. Quite
remarkably, we see that most of the effect is felt at the high-end of the wage distribution. While
also low-wage workers spend less time at their initial employer and move towards other firms,
effects for this category are about 10 times smaller and not significantly different from zero.
When hit by a negative shock, high-wage workers find new job opportunities in the non-tradable
sector and migrate towards other local labor markets. One possibility behind these effects is that
high-wage workers are more likely to be employed in exporting firms, which, during this period,
faced big losses in their market shares abroad, as a consequence of Chinese trade [Bugamelli
et al., 2017].
Although we do not observe the exporting status of firms directly, we corroborate this evidence
by looking at heterogeneous effects by the size of the firm. We divide firms according to their
average firm size in 1991. Small firms have between 0 and 19 employees; medium firms have
between 20 and 249 employees; big firms have more than 250 employees. We present the results
in Table 2.14. Consistently with the results by wage level, among individuals working in big
firms, we see that more exposed workers experience moderate gains in terms of employment and
earnings. These gains are not accrued at the initial employer, where they lose approximately
2 months of employment. Rather they spend more time out of manufacturing, into the non-
tradable sector, and out of their initial local labor market. Although workers in smaller firms
do not experience any change in employment outcomes, they earn less overall. A coefficient of
-0.023 (column (1), panel (c)) indicates that a 10 p.p. increase in import exposure leads to a
decrease in earnings per 12 months worked of 2.3% of average initial annual earnings, which
approximately correspond to 44 euros per month.29
29We looked into heterogeneous effects by other categorical variables such as gender and year of birth,
but did not detect any difference across groups. Results are available upon request.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we studied the effect of the recent rise of China as major worldwide manufacturing
producer on local labor markets and individual workers’ careers in Italy. While a robust finding
from recent works [Autor et al., 2013, Donoso et al., 2015] is that trade with China can account
for a substantial fraction of the decline of manufacturing employment, we find that the impact
on the Italian labor market has been modest. The lack of an overall change in employment
levels does not imply, however, that the manufacturing sector did not experience some important
transformations during this period. Opposite to a marked decrease in the share of manufacturing
workers employed in more traditional sectors like textile and apparel, in fact, there was a
corresponding increase in other sectors like metal manufacturing and machinery [Brandolini and
Bugamelli, 2009].
The “China shock" could also have deteriorated the careers of incumbent manufacturing workers,
whose industry-specific skills may not have allowed successful transitions towards other parts
of the economy [Autor et al., 2016]. Instead, our results suggest that the presence of new job
opportunities in low-skill-intensive industries in the non-tradable sector can help workers to
perform successful transitions, absorbing the initial shock. We also document that successful
transition were associated with an increase in geographical mobility towards areas with better
job opportunities.
While the presence of job opportunities in low-skill-intensive industries outside of manufacturing
can be peculiar to the Italian case, where non-tradables were gaining employment shares, our
results indicate that the ability of an economy to absorb an external shock crucially depends on
the macroeconomic context. From this perspective, it should be not surprising that the effects
of the China shock vary tremendously across countries, as documented by existing studies.
75
Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Employment in manufacturing across selected OECD countries
Notes: The Figure displays changes in the total number of workers employed in manufacturing
(1995=100). Author’s elaboration on EU-KLEMS data [O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009, Jäger, 2016].
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Table 2.1: Chinese import penetration and industry-level employment shares
∆ Import Employment Share (p.p.)
Penetration07−91 1991 2007
Tanning and dressing of leather 32.44 4.70 3.53
Furniture and manufacturing n.e.c. 25.84 5.97 6.27
Wearing apparel 19.58 8.46 5.03
Medical, optical and other instru-
ments
13.89 2.27 2.92
Machinery and equipment 13.49 10.45 12.67
Radio, television and communication
equip.
12.50 2.70 1.72
Basic metals 11.32 3.33 2.99
Electrical machinery 8.51 4.01 4.20
Textiles 8.16 7.43 4.82
Office, accounting and computing ma-
chinery
7.22 0.49 0.32
Fabricated metal products 5.86 11.83 15.93
Rubber and plastic 4.36 3.46 4.39
Other non-metallic mineral products 4.28 5.35 5.37
Other transport equipment 3.85 1.89 2.38
Wood and cork (except furniture) 3.79 3.60 3.66
Chemicals 2.38 4.57 4.17
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers
1.44 4.16 3.64
Paper 1.33 1.71 1.72
Publishing and printing 0.72 3.78 3.52
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear
fuel
0.61 0.56 0.50
Food and beverages 0.43 8.93 10.22
Tobacco 0.00 0.34 0.03
Notes: The second column reports the changes in import penetration from China, between 1991 and
2007, for each 2-digit ISIC3 industry. The change in import penetration is defined as ∆IP ITAjt =
∆MITAjt /(Yj,91 +Mj,91 −Xj,91). Correspondingly, the last two columns report industry employment
shares in total manufacturing employment in 1991 and 2007.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev.
Panel (a): LLM evidence
Long-differenced outcomes (1991-2007)
∆ manufacturing emp/work age pop (p.p.) -1.43 (2.71)
∆ non-tradables emp/work age pop (p.p.) 9.20 (5.17)
∆ total emp/work age pop (p.p.) 7.77 (5.08)
Import penetration changes (1991-2007)
∆ Import penetration (1991-2001) (p.p.) 0.68 (0.52)
∆ Import penetration (2001-2007) (p.p.) 3.52 (2.47)
Control variables (1991)
Female employment rate (p.p.) 27.50 (7.94)
Manufacturing share of empl. in 1991 (p.p.) 33.81 (11.51)
Panel (b): Worker-level evidence
Cumulative outcomes (1992-2007)
Months worked 157.26 51.74
Weeks worked 686.75 230.09
FTE weeks worked 674.99 234.59
Cumulative earnings (multiples of 1988-1991 average annual
earn.)
15.29 6.52
Cumulative earnings per 12 months worked (multiples of 1988-
1991 average annual earn.)
1.14 0.28
Years of positive earnings 13.80 4.10
Control variables (1983-1991)
Female (share) 0.32 0.47
Apprentice (share) 0.001 0.030
Blue collar (share) 0.72 0.45
White collar (share) 0.27 0.45
Foreign-born (share) 0.021 0.14
∆ log(earnings)1988−1991 0.09 0.21
Average log(earnings) in 1988-1991 10.06 0.30
Log average firm earnings in 1991 7.06 0.30
Share of white collars in industry in 1991 0.25 0.14
∆log(Earnings) 1983-1991 of industry 0.70 0.07
Notes: The table provides summary statistics for variables employed in both the local labour market
and worker-level analyses. In panel (a) averages are calculated starting from local labor markets and
weighted by start-of-period working-age population. In panel (b) we provide summary measures for
the set of all workers who had a year-round job in manufacturing in 1991 and also had a year-round
job in all years between 1988 and 1990. Months worked are defined as calendar months with at least
one day of positive earnings. Cumulative earnings measures are both expressed in multiples of average
1988-1991 earnings.
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Figure 2.2: Changes in manufacturing employment and import penetration across local
labor markets
(a) ∆ manufacturing share of w.a.p (b) ∆ Import penetration
Notes: The Figure displays 2001-2007 changes for 784 local labor markets. Subfigure (a) displays changes
in the share of working-age population that is employed in manufacturing. Subfigure (b) displays
changes in the import penetration ratio. Both measures are first residualized against the manufacturing
employment share in 2001.
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Table 2.3: Imports from China and changes in manufacturing employment (2SLS
estimates)
∆ manuf emp/work age pop (p.p.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel (a) : 1991-2007 stacked differences
∆Import penetrationITA (p.p.) -0.253*** -0.203*** -0.146*** -0.132***
(0.0436) (0.0478) (0.0425) (0.0471)
Panel (b) : First stage estimates
∆Import penetrationOC (p.p.) 0.0621*** 0.0587*** 0.0555*** 0.0585***
(0.00299) (0.00333) (0.00359) (0.00150)
Observations 1568 1568 1568 1568
K-P F-stat. 431.9 309.5 239.5 1525.2
Region FE NO YES YES YES
LLM controls NO NO YES YES
Weights YES YES YES NO
Notes: The table presents 2SLS regressions of the change in manufacturing employment over working
age (15-64) population against changes in the import penetration ratio, at the local labor market level
(N = 784). Region FE include 20 dummies. LLM controls include the female employment rate and
the manufacturing share in total employment in 1991. The latter corresponds to the number of people
employed in manfuacturing industries over total private non-farm employment. Regressions in columns 1
to 3 are weighted using beginning of period LLM working-age population. Standard errors are clustered
at the local labor market level and reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Future import from China and change of manufacturing employment between
1981 and 1991 (2SLS estimates)
∆′91−′81 manuf emp/work age pop (p.p.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Import penetrationITA1991−2001 (p.p.) 0.169 -0.324
(0.436) (1.232)
∆Import penetrationITA2001−2007 (p.p.) 0.0522 -0.00627
(0.0665) (0.211)
Observations 784 784 784 784
K-P F-stat. 620.5 899.3 143.5 617.7
Region FE YES YES YES YES
LLM controls YES YES YES YES
Weights YES NO YES NO
Notes: The table presents 2SLS regressions of the change in manufacturing employment over working
age (15-64) population between 1981 and 1991 against changes in future import penetration, at the
local labor market level (N = 784). In the first two columns the change in future import penetration
is computed between 1991 and 2001, in the last two columns the change in import penetration is
computed between 2001 and 2007. Region FE include 20 regions dummies. LLM controls include the
female employment rate and the manufacturing share in total employment, i.e. the number of people
employed in manfuacturing industries over total private non-farm employment, measured at the start
of the previous decade, i.e. in 1971. Regressions in columns 1 and 3 are weighted using beginning of
period LLM working-age population. Standard errors are clustered at the local labor market level and
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Import from China and other labor market outcomes (2SLS estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mfg. Non-trad. Total ∆ log w.a.p.
Empl. Empl. Empl.
∆Import penetrationITA -0.146*** -0.0412 -0.187** 0.00157
(0.0425) (0.0595) (0.0834) (0.00106)
Observations 1568 1568 1568 1568
K-P F-stat. 239.5 239.5 239.5 1525.2
Region FE YES YES YES YES
LLM controls YES YES YES YES
Weights YES YES YES NO
Notes: The table presents 2SLS regressions for the stacked difference model between 1991 and 2007.
In the first column the dependent variable is the change in manufacturing employment over working
age (15-64), as in column 3, panel a of table 2.3. In the second column the dependent variable is the
change in the number of people employed in non-tradables over working age (15-64) population. In
the third column the dependent variable is the change in the total number of people employed in the
private non-farm sector over working age (15-64) population. Finally, in the last column, the dependent
variable is the is the (natural) log change in working age (15-64) population. Coefficients in column (1)
and column (2) sum up to the coefficient in column (3). Region FE include 20 regions dummies. LLM
controls include the female employment rate and the manufacturing share in total employment, i.e.
the number of people employed in manfuacturing industries over total private non-farm employment,
measured at the start of the period. All regressions are weighted using beginning of period LLM
working-age population. Standard errors are clustered at the local labor market level and reported in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Rotemberg weights and industry-specific components
Variable αk βk 95% CI
Panel (a): United States
Top 5 Rotemberg weights industries (SIC87DD - 392 industries)
Electronic Computers 0.133 -0.358 [-0.74, 0.15]
Furniture and Fixtures, NEC 0.118 -0.732 [-1.06, -0.48]
Radio and TV Broadc. and Communic. Equipment 0.063 0.037 [-0.50, 0.83]
Semiconductors and Related Devices 0.052 -0.897 [-1.50, -0.49]
Games, Toys, and Children?s Vehicles 0.048 -0.205 [-0.49, 0.08]
Overall β = −0.674 (0.073)
Panel (b): Italy
Top 5 Rotemberg weights industries (ISIC Rev. 3 - 125 industries)
Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 0.557 0.023 [-0.06, 0.11]
Footwear 0.232 -0.276 [-0.43, -0.13]
Wearing apparel, except fur 0.054 -0.307 [-0.60, -0.04]
Knitted and crocheted fabrics 0.025 -0.802 [-1.63, -0.36]
Other general purpose machinery 0.023 -0.114 [-0.55, 0.33]
Overall β = −0.146 (0.043)
Notes: The table reports Rotemberg weights (αk) and associated marginal effects (βk) for industries
with the 5 highest Rotemberg weights, for the United States (panel (a)) and Italy (panel (b)). 95% CI
is the weak-IV robust confidence interval developed in Chernozhukov and Hansen [2008]. Industries
are at the 4-digit level and follow the SIC87DD classification in the United States and the ISIC Rev.
3 classification in Italy. Industry-level effects cannot be compared across panels as the number of
industries differs. The overall effect (β) is the IV estimate from using the Bartik instrument.
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Table 2.7: Import competition from China and cumulative labour market outcomes at the individual level over 1991-2007 (2SLS estimates)
Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative
Months Weeks FTE weeks Earnings Earnings per year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.013 0.077∗ 0.088∗ 0.003 0.009
(0.011) (0.045) (0.045) (0.002) (0.009)
Observations 692079 692079 692079 692079 692079
Full controls YES YES YES YES YES
K-P F-stat. 458.054 458.054 458.054 458.054 458.054
Notes: The table presents 2SLS regressions of individual labour market outcomes against changes in Chinese
import penetration. All outcomes are totals over the 16-year period between 1991 and 2007. In column (1)-(4)
the dependent variable is the number of months/weeks/full-time-equivalent weeks with at least one day of
positive earnings, respectively. For each spell, full-time equivalent weeks are constructed by multiplying the
number of weeks worked by the part-time percentage of that contract. In column (5) the dependent variable is
the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings. In
column (6) the dependent variable is 100× the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples
of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings, divided by (mi/12), where mi is the dependent variable in column (1).
The latter measure can be interpreted as cumulative earnings per 12 months worked, normalized by average
initial earnings. All regressions include a constant, and the full set of controls from specification 2.6. Standard
errors are clustered at the 4-digit sector level and reported in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Import competition from China and labor mobility (2SLS estimates)
Total Same firm Other firm
(1) (2) (3)
Panel (a) : Months with positive earnings
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.013 -0.069∗∗ 0.082∗∗
(0.011) (0.032) (0.032)
Panel (b) : Cumulative earnings
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.003 -0.009∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Panel (c) :Earnings per effective year
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.009 -0.007 0.033∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013)
Full controls YES YES YES
K-P F-stat. 458.054 458.054 458.054
Notes: The table presents 2SLS regressions of individual labour market outcomes against
changes in Chinese import penetration in Italy. In panel (a) the dependent variable is the
cumulative number of months with positive earnings in the private non-farm sector over
the 1991-2007 period. In panel (b) the dependent variable is the total of earnings accrued
over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings. In panel (c)
the dependent variable is 100× the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period,
in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings, divided by (mi/12), where mi is the
dependent variable in panel (a). The latter measure can be interpreted as cumulative
earnings per 12 months worked, normalized by average initial earnings. All regressions
include a constant, and the full set of controls. Standard errors are clustered at the
4-digit sector level and reported in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Import competition from China and labor mobility (2SLS estimates)
Within manuf. Outside manuf.
Other firm Same 2-dig Other 2-dig Non-tradables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel (a) : Months with positive earnings
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.082∗∗ -0.065∗∗ -0.047∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.021) (0.028)
Panel (b) : Cumulative earnings
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.011∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.005∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Panel (c) :Earnings per effective year
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.033∗∗ -0.015 0.009 0.091∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.021) (0.013)
Full controls YES YES YES YES
K-P F-stat. 458.054 458.054 458.054 458.054
Notes: The table presents 2SLS regressions of individual labour market outcomes against changes in Chinese import
penetration in Italy. In panel (a) the dependent variable is the cumulative number of months with positive earnings
in the private non-farm sector over the 1991-2007 period. In panel (b) the dependent variable is the total of earnings
accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings. In panel (c) the dependent
variable is 100× the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991
earnings, divided by (mi/12), where mi is the dependent variable in panel (a). The latter measure can be interpreted
as cumulative earnings per 12 months worked, normalized by average initial earnings. All regressions include a
constant, and the full set of controls. Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit sector level and reported in
parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.10: Import competition from China and labor mobility (2SLS estimates)
Non-tradables Non Knowledge Knowledge
intensive intensive
(1) (2) (3)
Panel (a) : Months with positive earnings
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.195∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.028) (0.035) (0.011)
Panel (b) : Cumulative earnings
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Panel (c) :Earnings per effective year
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.091∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.021)
Full controls YES YES YES
K-P F-stat. 458.054 458.054 458.054
Notes: The table presents 2SLS regressions of individual labour market outcomes against changes in
Chinese import penetration in Italy. In panel (a) the dependent variable is the cumulative number of
months with positive earnings in the private non-farm sector over the 1991-2007 period. In panel (b) the
dependent variable is the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average
yearly 1988-1991 earnings. In panel (c) the dependent variable is 100× the total of earnings accrued over
the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings, divided by (mi/12), where mi
is the dependent variable in panel (a). The latter measure can be interpreted as cumulative earnings per
12 months worked, normalized by average initial earnings. All regressions include a constant, and the
full set of controls. Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit sector level and reported in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: Import competition from China and labor mobility (2SLS estimates)
Other firm Same LLM Other LLM
(1) (2) (3)
Panel (a) : Months with positive earnings
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.082∗∗ -0.028∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.013) (0.030)
Panel (b) : Cumulative earnings
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.011∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Panel (c) :Earnings per effective year
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.033∗∗ 0.006 0.068∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Full controls YES YES YES
K-P F-stat. 458.054 458.054 458.054
Notes: The table presents 2SLS regressions of individual labour market outcomes against
changes in Chinese import penetration in Italy. In panel (a) the dependent variable is the
cumulative number of months with positive earnings in the private non-farm sector over the
1991-2007 period. In panel (b) the dependent variable is the total of earnings accrued over the
1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings. In panel (c) the dependent
variable is 100× the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average
yearly 1988-1991 earnings, divided by (mi/12), where mi is the dependent variable in panel
(a). The latter measure can be interpreted as cumulative earnings per 12 months worked,
normalized by average initial earnings. All regressions include a constant, and the full set of
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit sector level and reported in parentheses *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.12: Import competition from China and labor mobility (2SLS estimates)
Other LLM Same region Other region
(1) (2) (3)
Panel (a) : Months with positive earnings
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.110∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.006) (0.031)
Panel (b) : Cumulative earnings
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.015∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Panel (c) :Earnings per effective year
∆IP ITA2007−1991 0.068∗∗∗ 0.028 0.101∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.025) (0.020)
Full controls YES YES YES
K-P F-stat. 458.054 458.054 458.054
Notes: The table presents 2SLS regressions of individual labour market outcomes against changes
in Chinese import penetration in Italy. In panel (a) the dependent variable is the cumulative
number of months with positive earnings in the private non-farm sector over the 1991-2007 period.
In panel (b) the dependent variable is the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period,
in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings. In panel (c) the dependent variable is 100×
the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991
earnings, divided by (mi/12), where mi is the dependent variable in panel (a). The latter measure
can be interpreted as cumulative earnings per 12 months worked, normalized by average initial
earnings. All regressions include a constant, and the full set of controls. Standard errors are
clustered at the 4-digit sector level and reported in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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Table 2.13: Import competition effects and initial wage levels
Overall mobility Sectoral mobility Geographical mobility
Total Same firm Other firm Same 2-dig Other 2-dig Non-tradables Same LLM Other LLM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel (a) : Months with positive earnings
∆IP × low wage 0.012 -0.010 0.021 0.052∗ -0.065∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.005 0.016
(0.018) (0.038) (0.025) (0.029) (0.022) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020)
∆IP × medium wage 0.001 -0.060∗ 0.061∗∗ -0.036 -0.026 0.123∗∗∗ 0.002 0.059∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.036) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.018) (0.022)
∆IP × high wage 0.031∗∗ -0.117∗ 0.149∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.045∗ 0.393∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.069) (0.068) (0.059) (0.027) (0.043) (0.022) (0.066)
Panel (b) : Cumulative earnings
∆IP × low wage -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆IP × medium wage -0.001 -0.007∗ 0.006∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.004 0.014∗∗∗ -0.001 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
∆IP × high wage 0.009∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.005 0.050∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007)
Panel (c) :Earnings per effective year
∆IP × low wage -0.022∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.019 -0.043∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.011 -0.015 -0.006
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.027) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020)
∆IP × medium wage -0.007 -0.006 0.002 -0.007 -0.042∗ 0.063∗∗∗ -0.013 0.048∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.015) (0.023)
∆IP × high wage 0.041∗∗∗ -0.000 0.073∗∗∗ -0.004 0.060 0.128∗∗∗ 0.025 0.090∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.042) (0.036) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020)
Full controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
K-P F-stat. 18.261 18.261 18.261 18.261 18.261 18.261 18.261 18.261
Notes: The table presents 2SLS regressions of individual labour market outcomes against changes in Chinese import penetration in Italy. In panel
(a) the dependent variable is the cumulative number of months with positive earnings in the private non-farm sector over the 1991-2007 period. In
panel (b) the dependent variable is the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings. In
panel (c) the dependent variable is 100× the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings,
divided by (mi/12), where mi is the dependent variable in panel (a). The latter measure can be interpreted as cumulative earnings per 12 months
worked, normalized by average initial earnings. All regressions include a constant, and the full set of controls. High wage, medium wage and low wage
are dummies for terciles of average 1988-1991 earnings, within age cohort. Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit sector level and reported in
parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.14: Import competition effects and firm size
Overall mobility Sectoral mobility Geographical mobility
Total Same firm Other firm Same 2-dig Other 2-dig Non-tradables Same LLM Other LLM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel (a) : Months with positive earnings
∆IMP × small 0.009 0.012 -0.003 0.034 -0.058∗∗∗ 0.021 -0.006 0.003
(0.012) (0.029) (0.025) (0.027) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019)
∆IMP × medium -0.044∗∗ -0.034 -0.010 -0.067 -0.046 0.103∗∗∗ -0.010 0.001
(0.021) (0.067) (0.056) (0.063) (0.035) (0.018) (0.052) (0.028)
∆IMP × big 0.045∗∗ -0.234∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ -0.028 0.558∗∗∗ -0.077∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.090) (0.087) (0.062) (0.035) (0.080) (0.041) (0.097)
Panel (a) : cumulative earnings
∆IMP × small -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.006∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆IMP × medium -0.005 -0.005 -0.000 -0.007 -0.005 0.012∗∗∗ -0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
∆IMP × big 0.015∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.003 0.070∗∗∗ -0.008∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011)
Panel (c) :Earnings per effective year
∆IMP × small -0.023∗∗ -0.014∗ -0.024 -0.044∗∗∗ -0.033 -0.007 -0.019 -0.019
(0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021)
∆IMP × medium -0.007 -0.007 0.021 0.008 0.014 0.079∗∗ 0.018 0.065
(0.020) (0.018) (0.037) (0.040) (0.053) (0.037) (0.036) (0.054)
∆IMP × big 0.074∗∗∗ 0.007 0.103∗∗∗ 0.025 0.080∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.050) (0.038) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
Full controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
K-P F-stat. 18.261 18.261 18.261 18.261 18.261 18.261 18.261 18.261
Notes: The table presents 2SLS regressions of individual labour market outcomes against changes in Chinese import penetration in Italy. In panel (a)
the dependent variable is the cumulative number of months with positive earnings in the private non-farm sector over the 1991-2007 period. In panel
(b) the dependent variable is the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings. In panel (c)
the dependent variable is 100× the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings, divided
by (mi/12), where mi is the dependent variable in panel (a). The latter measure can be interpreted as cumulative earnings per 12 months worked,
normalized by average initial earnings. All regressions include a constant, and the full set of controls. Small, medium and big are dummies for firms
with 0-19, 20-249, 250 and more employees in 1991, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit sector level and reported in parentheses *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendices
2.A Additional Tables and Figures
Table 2.A.1: Import from China and change of manufacturing employment (OLS
estimates)
∆ manuf emp/work age pop (p.p.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel (a) : 1991-2007 stacked differences
∆Import penetrationITA -0.264*** -0.240*** -0.208*** -0.140***
(0.0396) (0.0433) (0.0429) (0.0403)
Observations 1568 1568 1568 1568
Region FE NO YES YES YES
LLM controls NO NO YES YES
Weights YES YES YES NO
Notes: The table presents OLS regressions of the change in manufacturing employment over working
age (15-64) population against changes in the import penetration ratio. Region FE include 20 dummies.
LLM controls include the female employment rate and the manufacturing share in total employment in
1991. The latter corresponds to the number of people employed in manfuacturing industries over total
private non-farm employment. Regressions in columns 1 to 3 are weighted using beginning of period
LLM working age population. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.A.2: Chinese import competition and individual labour market outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel (a): Months worked
∆Import penetrationITA -0.035 -0.028 -0.024 -0.009 -0.010 -0.002 0.013
(0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011)
Panel (b): Weeks worked
∆Import penetrationITA -0.140 -0.095 -0.069 -0.009 -0.016 0.011 0.077∗
(0.149) (0.150) (0.161) (0.074) (0.062) (0.059) (0.045)
Panel (c): FTE Weeks worked
∆Import penetrationITA -0.159 -0.088 -0.054 0.016 -0.009 0.021 0.088∗
(0.167) (0.162) (0.176) (0.082) (0.065) (0.061) (0.045)
Panel (d): cumulative earnings
∆Import penetrationITA -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Panel (e): earnings per effective year
∆Import penetrationITA 0.016 0.036∗∗ 0.029 0.030∗∗ 0.016 0.000 0.009
(0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009)
Year of birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Char. NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry PreTrend NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Individual Char. NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
Firm Char. NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
LLM FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
K-P F-stat. 110.980 341.532 416.147 418.732 424.936 458.054
Notes: This table presents 2SLS regressions of individual labour market outcomes against changes in
Chinese import penetration. All outcomes are totals over the 16-year period between 1991 and 2007. In
panels (a)-(e) the dependent variable is the number of months/weeks/full-time-equivalent weeks with at
least one day of positive earnings, respectively. For each spell, full-time equivalent weeks are constructed
by multiplying the number of weeks worked by the part-time percentage of that contract. In panel (d)
the dependent variable is the total of earnings accrued over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average
yearly 1988-1991 earnings. In panel (e) the dependent variable is 100× the total of earnings accrued
over the 1991-2007 period, in multiples of average yearly 1988-1991 earnings, divided by (mi/12), where
mi is the dependent variable in panel (a). The latter measure can be interpreted as cumulative earnings
per 12 months worked, normalized by average initial earnings. All regressions include a constant, and
the full set of controls from specification 2.6. Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit sector level
and reported in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.A.3: International comparison of the effects of Chinese import competition
Jobs lost Manuf. Empl1995 Perc. drop
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country 1990s 2000s
France 16,000 88,000 3,497,000 2.97%
Germany 312,000* 8,040,000 3.88%
Italy 24,000 119,000 4,637,000 3.08%
Norway 750 3,400 395,000 1.05%
Spain 51,000 280,000 2,385,000 13.87%
United States 548,000 980,000 17,231,000 8.87%
Notes: The table reports the number of manufacturing jobs that were lost due to the rise of China
(columns 1-2), the number of manufacturing jobs in 1995 (column 3), and the corresponding percentage
drop (column 4), by country. Figures in columns 1-2 are obtained via a variance decomposition first
presented in Autor et al. [2013] and only uses the supply-side component of trade with China. Results for
France come from [Malgouyres, 2017, p.422] and authors’ calculations based on descriptive statistics in
Table 1 of the same paper. Results for Germany come from [Dauth et al., 2014, p.1656], and results are
only available for the whole 1988-2008 period, indicated with (*). Effects also include Eastern-European
exposure. Results for Spain come from [Donoso et al., 2015, p. 1756] and authors’ calculations based
on footnote 14 of the same paper. Results from Norway come from [Balsvik et al., 2015, pp. 142-143].
Results from the US come from [Autor et al., 2013, p.2140]. Aggregate manufacturing figures in column
3 are obtained from EU-KLEMS [O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009, Jäger, 2016] for European countries
and authors’ calculations on figures in Balsvik et al. [2015], OECD [2019] and Eurostat [2019] for
Norway. Numbers in column (4) are obtained by summing numbers in columns 1-2 and dividing by
the corresponding figure in column (3). Time windows are slightly different across studies: Autor et al.
[2013] uses 1991-2000 and 2000-2007. Malgouyres [2017] uses 1995-2001 and 2001-2007. Donoso et al.
[2015] use 1999-2003 and 2003-2007. Balsvik et al. [2015] uses 1996-2001 and 2002-2007. Dauth et al.
[2014] uses 1988-2008.
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Chapter 3
What are the returns to apprenticeships? Evid-
ence from Italy
Luca Citino
Bank of Italy and London School of Economics
Abstract
What are the returns to apprenticeships? This paper tries to answer this question by leveraging
novel administrative data from Italy on individual careers. We adopt a difference-in-difference
methodology to compare the labor market outcomes of individuals starting an apprenticeship
with those of similar individuals starting temporary contracts that, at least formally, do not
provide training. We find apprenticeships to be a “double-edged sword”. While they do guarantee
a stronger labor market attachment during the first three years after the start of the contract, they
produce ambiguous effects afterwards. Apprenticeships increase the probability of conversion to
open-ended contracts, especially at the initial firm, but decrease the probability of obtaining
further temporary jobs, especially at other firms. Quantitatively, this second effect prevails,
generating a negative effect of the probability of having any job. These findings are consistent
with a model where retention rates after the end of an apprenticeship convey stronger signals
about workers’ ability compared to retention after the end of a temporary contract.
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3.1 Introduction
Apprenticeships are diffused in many European countries and constitute a middle-ground between
high school and university education. Although there are differences across countries, they
usually consist of job contracts where labour services are exchanged for certified training in an
occupation and a salary [Snell, 1996, Ryan, 2012]. In recent years apprenticeships acquired a
prominent place in the policy discourse about youth unemployment and the NEET problem,
with many governments offering reduced social security contributions or favorable taxation
regimes to incentivize their use [Kuczera, 2017]. Although in policy circles apprenticeships
are often seen as a panacea, providing young people with good jobs and valuable skills, the
economic reality may not be that simple. While it is true that apprentices ought to receive
training by virtue of a contractual obligation, it is not a given that on-the-job training provided
through apprenticeships has any real content. Firms may have scarce incentives to train if
the human capital they need for production is general [Becker, 1962] and even more so if the
labor market where they operate does not feature any frictions [Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999].
In such cases, given the low enforcement level of apprenticeship contracts, firms may renege
on the promise to provide training and the returns to apprenticeships would be close to zero
[Dustmann and Schönberg, 2012]. Conversely, firms will be more incentivized to provide training
to young workers if the human capital they need is firm-specific, or if labor market frictions are
substantial.
In this paper we empirically quantify the returns to apprenticeships by leveraging novel admin-
istrative matched employer employee data from the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS).
We have access to the full working history for the universe of individuals born in Italy in 1980
and 1981, regardless of whether they have been employees in the private sector, dependent
self-employed (parasubordinati) or self-employed. We define returns to apprenticeships as the
extra gain coming from starting an apprenticeship compared to a temporary contract. Similarly
to the former, temporary contracts also involve an employer-employee relationship but, at least
formally, they don’t require the firm to provide training. We perform this comparison in a
difference-in-difference framework at the job spell level.
The comparison of apprenticeships with other temporary contracts is not completely new in the
literature [Berton et al., 2011, Picchio and Staffolani, 2013] and is particularly relevant in the
Italian setting. On the one hand the vast majority of apprenticeships happen when individuals
have already left technical and vocational schools, and are not formally linked to the education
system.1 Also, apprentices’ training can take place entirely within the firm premises and trainees
1During the years 2007-2013 INPS data provide information on the type of apprenticeship contract.
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do not need to sit a formal examination at the end of the contract.2 These characteristics make
such contracts more similar to temporary training contracts than to a course of study. On the
other hand the question of whether apprenticeships are really any different from other types of
temporary contracts is recurrent in the Italian debate. Some scholars in other disciplines go as
far as saying that “Although a number of legal provisions establish compulsory training during
apprenticeship, reality is often very distant from the ideal apprenticeship model, and this tool
becomes a mere instrument of exploitation of a flexible and cheaper labour force” [Tiraboschi,
2012, p.20]. For these reasons we think that our focus on temporary contracts is indeed justified
to evaluate the returns to apprenticeships in our setting. Given that temporary contracts are
known to receive little or no firm-sponsored training [Booth et al., 2002, Albert et al., 2005],
they are suited to gauge the magnitude of the returns to training at the extensive margin.
To preview our results, we find that apprenticeships are a “double-edged sword”. They lead
to higher conversion rates towards open-ended contracts, but have a negative effect on the
probability of transitioning to other temporary contracts. Quantitatively, the second effect is
stronger and produces a negative average treatment effect on the probability of having a job
of any kind. We find that most conversions happen at the training firm, while the lack of job
opportunities in other temporary contracts is explained by what happens in other firms. On
the one hand, this indicates that training provided through apprenticeships is valuable and
that training firms are able to appropriate some rents from it.3 On the other hand it seems
that “recalls” do not explain why apprentices spend less time churning between other temporary
contracts.
Our findings can be rationalized in an asymmetric information model with adverse selection,
where the absence of conversion to a permanent position for an apprentice conveys a stronger
signal about ability than for a temporary contract. This can be the case if temporary contracts
can fail to be converted because of reasons that are exogenous to the worker’s ability with
higher probability than apprentices (e.g. the task is temporary in nature ...). In this sense
apprenticeships constitute a riskier investment compared to a temporary contract, and its
convenience may depend on a worker’s ability level and preferences. Alternatively, apprentices
may be acquiring firm-specific human capital that is not necessarily useful outside the training
firm, and leads to a penalty in terms of future job offers from other firms.
When looking at earnings, we find that, conditional on working, apprenticeships pay off in
the first three years after the start of the contract. However we fail to detect any long-run
The share of apprenticeships linked to upper-secondary education was 19.8% in 2007 and steadily
declined throughout the time window, reaching a low of 4.6% in 2013.
2Cassazione, sent. 845/1988.
3We leave the question open as to whether such training is firm-specific or if rent extraction is allowed
by labour market imperfections [Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999]
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effects. Earnings effects are not significantly different from zero six years after having started
the contract.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the returns to apprenticeships. Various other
studies have measured the extent to which apprenticeships constitute a valid opportunity for
the young, when compared to different alternative opportunities. The general consensus so
far reached is that apprentices are better off in terms of wages if compared to low-skilled
workers with no apprenticeship training, but not if compared to individuals completing full-time
vocational education in the classroom (for a review see Samek Lodovici et al. [2013]). Also,
while apprenticeships facilitate the school-to-work transition and pay off at an early stage of the
working life, their effects may be more muted in the longer run [Samek Lodovici et al., 2013,
Hanushek et al., 2017, Parey, 2016].
More in detail, Parey [2016] compares firm-sponsored training with school-based vocational
education. He finds that the two tracks do not offer different returns, but that in the very
short run firm-based apprenticeships provide stronger labor market attachment. He also finds
no effects on wages. Similarly Albanese et al. [2017] compares two apprenticeship tracks that
co-existed in Italy in the early 2000s, one of which emphasized firm-sponsored training rather
than school-based vocational education. In line with Parey [2016], they find that firm-sponsored
training improved the prospects of young workers, increasing their probability of transitioning
to open-ended contracts but it also raised their wage levels, especially in bigger firms. Cavaglia
et al. [2018] also find positive effects in the UK context. They find that apprentices yield
substantial earning premia, especially for men. Fersterer et al. [2008] compare longer and shorter
apprenticeships. For identification they exploit the unexpected closure of firms that employ
apprentices at different tenure horizons. At such intensive margin, they find that an extra year
into apprenticeship yields a 3.8% return in terms of higher earnings.
Due to a similar choice of a control group, the studies closest in spirit to ours are Picchio and
Staffolani [2013] and Berton et al. [2011]. The first paper exploits age limits in the Italian
apprenticeship system and use a regression discontinuity design to compare individuals who
manage to get an apprenticeship just before age 30 and those who do not manage to do so.
The authors find that, around age 30, individuals who start an apprenticeship are more likely
to transition towards open-ended contracts, especially at the initial firm. The second paper
uses a Multinomial Logit with individual fixed effects to study the transition matrices between
different types of temporary contracts (including apprenticeships) and open-ended contracts.
We extend these analyses in different ways: first we characterize the full time profile of returns
to apprenticeships at the quarterly frequency and are able to look into the long run, up to
six years after the start of the contract. Second, thanks to the matched employer-employee
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nature of the data we can look at how much of the conversion rate to open-ended contracts can
be explained by the training firm or the other firms. Third we look at heterogeneous effects
depending on firm size and are able to look at new outcomes that were unstudied before due to
data limitations, such as the probability of entering self-employment.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe how apprenticeships are regulated
in Italy and the data we employ for our analysis. In Section 3.3 we present our identification
strategy and regression framework. In Section 3.4 and we present our main findings. In Section
3.5 we present some heterogeneity analysis along the firm size dimension. In Section 3.6 we
present other results on the self-employment margin and on earnings. In Section 3.7 we discuss
our results and in Section 3.8 we conclude.
3.2 Institutional Framework and Data
3.2.1 Apprenticeships in Italy
The Italian apprenticeship system is made of three separate programmes, with different rules: (1)
“right and duty” (Apprendistato per l’espletamento del diritto/dovere di istruzione), performed
during upper secondary education for individuals aged 15-18 (2) “occupational” (Apprendistato
professionalizzante), usually performed after the completion of secondary education, for indi-
viduals aged 18-29 and (3) “higher” (Apprendistato di alta formazione e ricerca), still oriented
to individuals between 18 and 29, but who are enrolled in or have already earned a university
degree and would like to carry out a thesis or a research project within a firm. In our analysis
we require individuals to be at least 22 when doing their apprenticeships, so this excludes type
(1) apprenticeships by construction.4 On the other hand in the data we do not have information
needed to distinguish apprenticeships of type (2) from those of type (3) before 2007 or after
2013, so in what follows type (2) and type (3) are pooled together. Again, we stress the fact
that the vast majority of apprenticeships in Italy are of type (2).
In terms of contractual obligations, apprenticeships are job contracts, limited to the private
sector, in which worker and firm regularly pay social security contributions and work accidents
insurance. The formal training content of apprenticeships is quite low. The minimum number
of training hours that the firm must provide is 120 per year, split in the following way: 65% are
dedicated to occupation-specific training and 35% are dedicated to general training (job safety,
psychology of labor and team working). In exchange for training, firms obtain a reduction in
4Our analysis excludes individuals younger than 22 at start of the contract in order to have sufficient
information on the pre-event working history. This allows us to test whether individuals displayed
parallel trends in the outcome variable before the onset of the contract.
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social security contributions. The latter amounts to 10% of apprentices’ gross earnings, compared
to 27% for open-ended and temporary contracts. Also, firms can pay apprentices a lower wage,
up to two levels below what a qualified worker would get, according to the corresponding
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). At the end of the programme the workers receive a
certification which is recognized by firms applying the same CBA. This implies a worker cannot
be trained twice for the same occupation in the same CBA. Eligibility on the side of firms is
linked to the presence of a mentor. The mentor must attend preparatory training and cannot
train more than 5 individuals at each point in time. The law sets ceilings in apprenticeship use:
they can never be more than the number of qualified workers in the firm (however if firm size is
less than 3 the firm can hire up to 3 apprentices). Eligibility on the side of workers is exclusively
age-dependent. Recent reforms raised the age limits (measured on the day of hiring).5 A more
complete description of the Italian apprenticeship contract and its recent reforms can be found
in Albanese et al. [2017].
3.2.2 Data sources
We use administrative data on careers at the individual level made available by the Italian Social
Security Institute (INPS) through the VisitINPS initiative. Below we present each source in
detail:
Matched employer-employee data: our primary source is a matched employer-employee
dataset covering all job spells in non-agricultural firms with at least one employee. The dataset
spans the whole time period 1983-2017. The public sector and firms with no employees are
not included. The data records the presence of job spells at the monthly frequency, which
gives us the advantage tracing career dynamics at a very fine level. In each month we observe
at which firm(s) the worker is employed, the type of contract(s) the worker has (open-ended,
temporary), the type of work-time arrangement (full time or part time) and a coarse occupation
code (apprentice, blue collar, white collar, supervisor or manager). Absent any change in the
aforementioned characteristics, we observe one earning record per year for each worker. In case a
worker has a contractual change during the year (e.g. becomes a white collar worker or changes
firm) we see two separate earning records. This allows us to precisely separate earning records
which belong to different contract characteristics, different firms and different years. For each
individual we also observe a series of basic socio-demographic characteristics such as gender,
year of birth and place of birth. Given the nature of the dataset, we are also able to build the
total firm size in every year, and therefore check whether individuals starting apprenticeships in
5The 1997 (Treu) reform: from age 20 to age 24 (but 27 in regions entitled to EU structural funds -
i.e. the South - and age 29 in artisan firms). The 2003 (Biagi) reform: from age 24 to age 29 in all
firms in all regions.
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bigger firms obtain higher returns.
Dependent self-employment spells: starting from 1996, we also have information on de-
pendent self-employment. The latter is a form of work where workers are formally self-employed
but de facto employees [Williams and Lapeyre, 2017]. This dataset also has a matched employer-
employee structure. For each job spell we observe unique worker and firm identifiers, the
beginning and end date of the spell, the type of contract and the overall compensation received
for the job in every year. Given that firm and worker identifiers are the same across datasets we
are able to merge this information with the matched employer-employee dataset.
Contribution Histories: for a subset of individuals in the matched employer-employee dataset
we were able to obtain further information on their full contribution history, including spells
as self-employed. This allows us to build more precise measures of labour market outcomes
and investigate whether apprenticeships have an impact on the probability of entering self-
employment. This dataset does not contain a firm identifier. We obtained such information for
the universe of individuals born in Italy between 1980 and 1981, that is our main sample of
interest.
3.2.3 Sample selection and variable construction
Our initial sample is made of all individuals born in Italy in 1980 and 1981. We focus on
these two cohorts because information on whether an individual works in an open-ended or
temporary contract is only available from 1998 onwards (approximately when our individuals
leave upper-secondary education). On the other hand we don’t choose cohorts younger than
1981 to have a long enough period to observe the evolution of the outcome variables. We restrict
the sample only to those individuals who ever started an apprenticeship or a temporary contract
between age 22 and age 29. We do not consider contracts starting before age 22 in order to
have enough information on past working history, which is useful to check for the presence of
underlying pre-trends.
In what follows, we refer to the start of either a temporary contract or an apprenticeship as an
event. Apprenticeships are treatment events, while temporary contracts are control events. In
our empirical strategy, we will look at the differential evolution of outcomes of interest around
the event date, between these two types of events.
Among events we only consider first-time temporary contracts and first-time apprenticeships.
Further apprenticeships or temporary contracts are not considered, although they contribute to
the construction of the outcome variables. An individual may appear more than once (twice at
most) in the sample if she starts a temporary contract and then starts an apprenticeship at a
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later age. In this case we include both events in the regression and study them separately.6 To
the contrary, if an individual starts an apprenticeship and then starts a temporary contract at
a later age, only the apprenticeship is included as an event - the temporary contract is used
for the construction of outcome variables. If apprenticeships indeed have dynamic effects, then
including the latter type of temporary contracts in the set of events risks contaminating the
control group and invalidating our design. For similar reasons we drop all individuals who do an
apprenticeship and a temporary contract at exactly the same age. Our final sample consists of
285,422 events, either apprenticeships contracts (103,878) or a temporary contracts (181,544).
Although our data would allow us to construct employment outcomes at the monthly frequency,
we collapse our dataset at the quarterly level for computational convenience. All employment
outcomes are coded as dummy variables, taking value one when the condition is true for at least
one month during the quarter. Due to workers changing jobs or holding multiple jobs within a
quarter, employment outcomes are never mutually exclusive.
3.2.4 Summary statistics
A description of our final sample can be found in Table 3.1. Apprentices and temporary contracts
are not very dissimilar during the quarters leading to the start of the contract. While apprentices
have slightly more work experience, they do not seem to have had higher probabilities to hold
open-ended contracts before. Their previous wage levels (conditional on working) are also
remarkably similar, indicating that apprentices are not particularly selected compared to workers
obtaining temporary contracts. It is nonetheless true that apprentices start their contract
approximately one year before. In our main specification we control for age fixed effects to
account for these differences, although this makes little difference in the estimated coefficients.
3.3 Estimating returns to apprenticeships
In this paper we define returns to apprenticeship as the extra gain in labor market outcomes an
individual obtains from starting an apprenticeship relative to another type of temporary contract
that does not oblige the firm to provide training. We employ a dynamic difference-in-differences
(DiD) strategy to compare the differential evolution of several labour market outcomes across
individuals who start either type of contract. Our identification strategy is valid under a standard
parallel-trend assumption i.e. individuals in apprenticeships would have followed the same trend
as individuals in temporary contracts, had they started one. To corroborate the validity of
6In order to treat this case we always include individual×event fixed effects, but cluster standard
errors at the individual level.
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this assumption, we check whether individuals starting apprenticeships were on different trends
compared to individuals starting temporary contracts, in the quarters leading up to the start of
the job. We find no evidence of underlying pre-trends, which reassures about the validity of our
design.
Our unit of analysis is an individual i, whom we follow in the quarters k leading up to, and after
an event j. Since the same individual may be present more than once in our data, we cluster
standard errors at the individual level, but analyze each event separately and therefore include
event-specific fixed effects. We run regressions of the form:
Yijt = αj + ηt + θa +
23∑
k=−4
βk × 1(distancej = k)
+
23∑
k=−4
βTk × 1(distancej = k) × Apprenticej + ijt.
(3.1)
where Yijt is a labor market outcome for individual i, around event j, measured in calendar
year × quarter t; αj are event fixed effects, which control for any time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity at the worker level when starting either her first apprenticeship or first temporary
contract, and ηt are year × quarter fixed effects, which control for time-varying unobservables
that are common across the two groups. We also include age fixed effects (θa), in quarters, to
control for life-cycle patterns that are common across the two groups. Given that both our
treatment and control group are assigned to a job contract at distance time k = 0, we include both
a set of distance-to-event dummies that are common to both groups i.e. 1(distancej = k), and a
set of distance-to-event dummies interacted with treatment i.e. 1(distancej = k) × Apprenticej .
This specification is very similar to Jaravel et al. [2018] and addresses the presence of dynamic
effects around the start of the contract for both treatment and control group. The resulting
coefficients may be interpreted as a tenure profile that is specific to each group.7
The coefficients of interest are the βTk , for k 6= −1. Due to multicollinearity issues we omit
both 1(distancej = −1) × Apprenticej and 1(distancej = −1). All coefficients βTk must thus
be interpreted as changes in the difference across the two groups relative to any pre-existing
difference at distance k = −1 (one quarter before event). It follows that βTk = βk = 0 ∀k < 0
implies the absence of differential trends in outcome variables before the start of the treatment.
7We are not including any other control that is time invariant such as firm characteristics in quarter
k = 0, as these would be absorbed by the event fixed effects. On the other hand we do not condition on
the covariates which vary after the start of the contract because these would constitute a bad control.
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3.4 Main Results
3.4.1 Graphical evidence on the returns to apprenticeships
As a first step in describing the kind of variation we exploit in the data, we turn our attention
to Figure 3.1. The hollow markers represent the share of individuals who have an open-ended
contract, as a function of event time k, for individuals who will start either an apprenticeship
(circles) or a temporary contract (diamonds) in event time k = 0. The outcome can thus be
interpreted as the probability of having an open-ended contract. The two curves evolve parallel
in the quarters before the start of the contract, suggesting that our research design is valid. The
solid circles instead are corresponding difference-in-differences estimates (βˆTk ) from specification
3.1. Associated 95% confidence intervals are also displayed. The graph displays an increase
in labor market prospects following the start of either type of contract, as reflected in the
higher probability of obtaining an open-ended contract in the quarters after k = 0. However,
the dynamic evolution of the two paths clearly differs. Compared to temporary contracts,
apprenticeships yield a negative short term effect, most likely due to the fact that individuals are
locked-in their initial training contract (an “incapacitation effect”), but recover afterwards. The
recovery from the negative effects follows a step function with more pronounced jumps at quarters
8, 12 and 16 after the start of the contract. This is reasonable because apprenticeships that
are brought to completion have (in the majority of cases) fixed durations that are multiples of
one year. We still see departures from the step function because apprenticeships may terminate
before due to either of the two parties’ willingness to stop.8 After quarter 16 we see that
apprenticeships have 8.5 p.p. higher probability of being converted to open-ended, an effect that
remains stable up to six years after the start of the contract.
Given this framework, we now turn to the study of different outcomes. Together with the
probability of being converted to open-ended contracts, in Figure 3.2 we overlay estimates for
two other outcomes: the probability of having a temporary contract, and the probability of
having either of the two, that is the probability of having any job that is not an apprenticeship.9
When looking at the two other outcomes we see that starting an apprenticeship instead of
a temporary contract mechanically causes a sharp drop in both the probability of holding a
8By the law, apprenticeships have the same EPL coverage as open-ended contracts. They can only
be dismissed under a “just cause” or “justified motive”, because of economic or disciplinary reasons
respectively. Temporary contracts can only be terminated under a “just cause”. However firms can roll
the latter over, generating more moments at which firms can terminate the working relationship.
9Individuals who have more than one job at the same time or transition from a job type to another
within the same quarter will be recorded in the data as having both an open-ended and a temporary
contract in the same quarter. For this reason the coefficient associated to “employee but not apprentice”
is not necessarily equal to the sum of coefficients associated to “open-ended contracts” and “temporary
contracts”.
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temporary contract or having any job that is not an apprenticeship. Over time this effect is
gradually reduced for both outcomes, as workers start new spells and transition towards different
contractual forms. We see that by the end of the period, apprenticeships induce a decrease in
the probability of having temporary contracts of around 13.1 p.p.. Quantitatively this effect is
stronger than the positive effect on open-ended contracts first analyzed in Figure 3.1, which is
reflected in coefficient associated with the probability of being in any job contract that is not an
apprenticeship.
In sum, apprenticeships are indeed associated with higher probability of having an open-ended
contract on average, but this comes at the expense of a much lower probability of having a
temporary contract, with the second effect dominating. The combination of these forces implies
a negative treatment effect of around 4 p.p on the probability of having any job that is not an
apprenticeship after a six year period.
3.4.2 Decomposition according to firm mobility patterns
In the previous subsection we highlighted that apprenticeships confer to workers a higher
probability of obtaining open-ended contracts and lower probabilities to have temporary ones.
In this subsection we investigate where these gains or losses are accrued. It could be that
apprenticeships lead to higher conversion rates to open-ended jobs at the training firms but
lower probability of obtaining an open-ended contract elsewhere. Similarly, the lower probability
of churning among other temporary jobs may be due to the fact that temporary contracts
give workers the possibility to be periodically recalled by the same firm, a fact documented in
Scrutinio [2019]. In what follows we decompose both the probability of having an open-ended
contract and the probability of having a temporary contract in spells at the initial firm and at
other firms. Similarly to before, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 plot βTk coefficients and associated 95%
confidence intervals.
Let us consider Figure 3.3 first. We see that apprenticeships have a positive impact on the
probability of being employed under an open-ended contract at the initial firm but a negative
effect on the same outcome in other firms. Although the overall effect is positive, the entirety
of gains in terms of conversion to open-ended contracts are accrued at the training firm while
the probability of obtaining open-ended contracts at other firms contributes negatively to the
overall effect. This is consistent both with the accumulation of firm-specific human capital and a
high degree of wage compression which limits poaching by competing firms in the post-training
period. An apprenticeship increases on average the probability of conversion at the initial firm
by 10.6 p.p.
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Figure 3.4 has a similar structure and displays DiD estimates for the probability of having a
temporary job (solid dots) and a decomposition thereof in the the probability of having it at the
initial firm or in other firms. We see that apprenticeships do not miss out on the opportunity of
obtaining other temporary contracts at the initial firm. However we see that the majority of
the effect is explained by what happens in other firms. This goes against an explanation based
on higher recall rates for temporary contracts. Rather, it seems that individuals in temporary
contracts become more able to move across different firms with the same contractual form.
3.5 Heterogeneous effects
3.5.1 Effects by firm size
In this subsection we look at whether main results are different depending on the size of the firm
where the individual starts the contract.10 In order to do this we carry out the same analysis as
before, separately for big and small firms. We classify a firm as being “big” if its average size is
strictly greater than 15 in the solar year when the contract starts, and “small” otherwise.
To summarize results, we report βT23 coefficients in bar charts and present the corresponding
event study graphs in the Appendix. In Figure 3.5 we look at the probability of being employed
under an open-ended contract, a temporary contract or either of the two 23 quarters (including
0) after the start of the contract. We see that the overall probability of having an open-ended
contract is not different across the two groups. What differs is the probability of being employed
in other temporary contracts. Big firms give a substantial disadvantage in this respect. As a
consequence, the overall probability of having a job is negative only in big firms, but not in
small firms.
When decomposing the rate of conversion to open-ended contracts in Figure 3.6 we notice two
interesting facts. First, big firms convert apprenticeships to permanent positions at a much
higher rate than small firms. The effect in small firms is 9 p.p. while the one in big firms is 15
p.p, a 66% increase. Secondly, small firms produce higher rates of conversions to open-ended
contracts in other firms. The same is not true for big firms, as they have a negative impact on
the probability of obtaining permanent position in other firms. When looking at the overall
effect, these two mechanism compensate each other: apprenticeships in both types of firms are
associated an increase in the probability of having an open-ended contract by 12 p.p..
We perform a very similar exercise for the probability of being employed under temporary
10We performed an heterogeneity analysis also based on gender and found identical results for men
and women. Results are available upon request.
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contracts. Results are displayed in Figure 3.7. We see that the qualitative pattern this time is
very similar in both small and big firms. Apprenticeships unambiguously decrease the probability
of churning in other temporary contracts, especially in firms other than the initial one. In small
firms, the lack of other temporary contracts outside the initial firms accounts for about 90% of
the overall impact, while the same figure is 94% for big firms.
3.6 Other results
3.6.1 Self-employment effects
Self-employment is very diffused in Italy and constitutes around 20% of the workforce, way above
the European average [Istat, 2017].11 It is therefore interesting to check whether apprenticeships
contribute positively or negatively towards the individual choice of entering self-employment.
From an economic standpoint, the direction of the effect is ambiguous. On the one hand
apprenticeships increase the conversion rates at the initial firm, as firms train workers to keep
them and extract rents from their accumulated human capital. On the other hand apprenticeships
may want to learn a trade to establish their own entrepreneurial activity.
In Figure 3.8 we study three outcomes: the probability of working, the probability of being
an employee and the probability of being self-employed. As described in previous sections,
apprenticeships have a negative impact on the probability of being employees. Here we found
that this is not compensated by the self-employment margin. To the contrary, apprenticeships
have a negative impact on the probability of being self-employed. Despite being statistically
significant, this effect is quantitatively small, in the order of magnitude of 1 p.p..
3.6.2 Wage effects
In Figure 3.9 we study the impact of apprenticeships on wages. Our dependent variable is
now the log of quarterly earnings, conditional on working status. Our data does not record
earnings at the quarterly frequency, but we still have information on the total amount of earnings
received in a given year, separately by job characteristics and employer, in addition to detailed
information on which exact months of the year these income flows refer to. In order to construct
our measure of quarterly earnings we therefore apportion job-spell earnings to quarters based
on the proportion of months accounted for by any given spell.12
11Our definition of self-employed includes both freelancers (libero professionista), entrepreneurs
(titolare d’impresa) and their collaborators (coadiutore d’impresa).
12Notice that our measure is imprecise only insofar a worker can receive a pay rise that is not also
reflected in a job-title change. If instead a worker receives a pay rise but is also promoted from blue
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Given that we established that apprenticeships have an impact on the overall probability of
employment, our wage results ought to be interpreted with care. Conditional on having a job,
we see that apprenticeships are associated with substantial wage gains. However the effects
fade over time and are not statistically distinguishable from zero at the very last quarter of our
observation period.
3.7 Discussion
The main result in this paper is that on average apprenticeships can ease workers’ transition
towards open-ended contracts, but to the expense of fewer positions in other temporary contracts.
The two effects do not mechanically cancel out: quantitatively, the second effect dominates,
generating a negative impact on the probability of having any job. In this sense, apprenticeships
seem to constitute a double-edged sword, because they allow workers to climb higher rungs on
the job ladder but lead to higher penalties when conversion to open-ended does not happen.
There are different theoretical mechanisms that can rationalize these findings. The first possibility
is that apprenticeships are more accurate screening devices for individual ability than are
temporary contracts. Within the training firm, employers may learn workers’ types precisely,
thanks to higher monitoring and more frequent interactions. Other firms in the markets will
then also have access to part of this private information, by observing apprentices’ retention
choice (or lack thereof). An apprenticeship that is not converted to an open-ended contract
reveals the presence of a lower productivity type. To the contrary, temporary contracts are
not as precise screening devices as apprenticeships. While the initial firm may still learn a lot
about worker types during this period, temporary contract may fail to be renewed because of
exogenous reasons with higher probability, and therefore should lead to a weaker updating by
the other firms in the market.
The second possibility is that apprentices acquire firm-specific skills that are not easily re-usable
at other employers. To the contrary tasks performed in temporary contracts may be more
standardized. Even here, dismissals after apprenticeships should lead to a penalty in the labor
market, as time was “wasted" learning things not valued elsewhere. This would be consistent with
recent evidence showing that apprenticeships may generate specific skills and scarce adaptability
to new environments [Hanushek et al., 2017]. The two stories are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, and disentangling the two is left for future research.
collar to white collar, we would observe two earning records
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3.8 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the returns to apprenticeships by looking at a variety of labor
market outcomes. In terms of conversion to open-ended contracts, apprenticeships are dominated
by temporary contracts in the first three years after the start of the contract, but guarantee
higher conversion rates afterwards, by about 8.5 p.p.. All of these extra conversions happen
at the initial firm, while conversions to open-ended in other firms negatively contribute to the
overall effect. While they increase the probability of accessing better jobs, they decrease the
probability of obtaining further temporary contracts. This second effect is bigger (-13.1 p.p.)
and negatively impacts the probability of having any job. We find transitions to self-employment
not to be an important margin of adjustment in this context. Taken together, our results
highlight a trade-off between the quality and the quantity of job offers that could result after
starting an apprenticeship.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Apprentices Temporary contracts
Variable (pre-event average) Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Prob. of having any job 0.230 0.421 0.147 0.354
Prob. of being an employee 0.202 0.402 0.118 0.323
Prob. of being a blue collar 0.121 0.327 0.080 0.271
Prob. of being a white collar 0.084 0.278 0.039 0.193
Prob. having open-ended contract 0.096 0.295 0.114 0.318
Prob. having temporary contract 0.109 0.311 0 0
Age at start of spell (years) 24.098 1.978 25.01 2.139
Average monthly earnings (euros) 1250.82 610.614 1232.238 654.895
Number of spells 100,547 179,528
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for our main sample. All variables are measured as
an average of the four quarters before the start of the contract. All employment outcomes are dummy
variables that take value one if the condition is true for at least one month during the quarter. As
a consequence outcomes are never mutually exclusive. The probability of having any job includes
both employment, dependent self-employment and self-employment. Average quarterly earnings is
expressed in 2017 euros and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. It includes all earnings from
either employment and dependent self-employment. Earnings from self-employment are not included.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Probability of being an open-ended contract
Note: The figure plots the dynamic evolution of the mean probability of being in an open-ended contract,
for apprentices and individuals in temporary contracts (hollow circles and diamonds respectively). Solid
blue circles indicate difference-in-differences estimates (βTk ) from specification 3.1. The difference at
event time k = −1 is normalized at zero. Event time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both
the apprenticeship and the temporary contract start. Standard errors for the difference-in-differences
estimates are clustered at the individual level and corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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Figure 3.2: Probability of being in temporary or open-ended contracts
Note: The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for three outcomes: the probability of being
employed under an open-ended contract, the probability of being employed under a temporary contract
and the probability of being employed except for apprenticeship contracts. The latter constitutes the
union of the former two events. The difference at event time k = −1 is normalized at zero. Event
time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both the apprenticeship and the temporary contract start.
Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the individual level and
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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Figure 3.3: Probability of being in open-ended contracts at initial or other firms
Note: The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for three outcomes: the probability of
being employed under an open-ended contract, the probability of being employed under an open-ended
contract at the same firm where the contract is started (k = 0) and the probability of being employed
under an open-ended contract in firms other than the firm where the contract started. The latter
constitutes the union of the former two events. The difference at event time k = −1 is normalized at
zero. Event time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both the apprenticeship and the temporary
contract start. Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the individual
level and corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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Figure 3.4: Probability of being in temporary contracts at initial or other firms
Note: The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for three outcomes: the probability of
being employed under a temporary contract, the probability of being employed under a temporary
contract contract at the same firm where the contract is started (k = 0) and the probability of being
employed under a temporary contract in firms other than the firm where the contract started. The
latter constitutes the union of the former two events. The difference at event time k = −1 is normalized
at zero. Event time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both the apprenticeship and the temporary
contract start. Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the individual
level and corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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Figure 3.5: Probability of being in temporary or open-ended contracts by firm size
Note: The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for k = 23 only, run separately for contracts
started in small firms and big firms. A firm is defined as big if its average size in the solar year when
the contract starts is strictly greater than 15 and small otherwise. Three outcomes are displayed: the
probability of being employed under an open-ended contract, the probability of being employed under a
temporary contract and the probability of being employed except for apprenticeship contracts. The
latter constitutes the union of the former two events. Standard errors for the difference-in-differences
estimates are clustered at the individual level. Confidence intervals are not displayed, but estimates are
always significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 3.6: Probability of being in open-ended contracts at initial or other firms by firm
size
Note: The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for k = 23 only, run separately for contracts
started in small firms and big firms. A firm is defined as big if its average size in the solar year when
the contract starts is strictly greater than 15 and small otherwise. Three outcomes are displayed: the
probability of being employed under an open-ended contract, the probability of being employed under
an open-ended contract at the same firm where the contract is started (k = 0) and the probability
of being employed under an open-ended contract in firms other than the firm where the contract
started. Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the individual level.
Confidence intervals are not displayed, but estimates are always significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 3.7: Probability of being in temporary contracts at initial or other firms by firm
size
Note: The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for k = 23 only, run separately for contracts
started in small firms and big firms. A firm is defined as big if its average size in the solar year when
the contract starts is strictly greater than 15 and small otherwise. Three outcomes are displayed: the
probability of being employed under a temporary contract, the probability of being employed under a
temporary contract at the same firm where the contract is started (k = 0) and the probability of being
employed under a temporary contract in firms other than the firm where the contract started. Standard
errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the individual level. Confidence intervals
are not displayed, but estimates are always significant at the 1% level.
117
Figure 3.8: Employment and self-employment
Note: The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for different outcomes. The difference at
event time k = −1 is normalized at zero. Event time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both the
apprenticeship and the temporary contract start. Given that mechanically both groups have Pr(any
job= 1|k = 0) = 1, the point estimate at k = 0 equals the level difference that exists between the
two groups at k = −1. Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the
individual level and corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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Figure 3.9: Log(quarterly earnings)
Note: The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1. The dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of quarterly earnings, conditional on working status. Earnings include both labor income
from employment and dependent self-employment. We have no reliable information on earnings as
self-employed. Quarterly earnings are constructed by apportioning yearly earning amounts to quarters
in proportion to the number of months spent in a given spell. The difference at event time k = −1 is
normalized at zero. Event time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both the apprenticeship and the
temporary contract start. Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the
individual level and corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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Appendices
3.A Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 3.A.1: Probability of being in temporary or open-ended contracts (small firms)
The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for three outcomes: the probability of being
employed under an open-ended contract, the probability of being employed under a temporary contract
and the probability of being employed except for apprenticeship contracts. The latter constitutes the
union of the former two events. The difference at event time k = −1 is normalized at zero. Event
time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both the apprenticeship and the temporary contract start.
Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the individual level and
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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Figure 3.A.2: Probability of being in temporary or open-ended contracts (big firms)
Note: The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for three outcomes: the probability of being
employed under an open-ended contract, the probability of being employed under a temporary contract
and the probability of being employed except for apprenticeship contracts. The latter constitutes the
union of the former two events. The difference at event time k = −1 is normalized at zero. Event
time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both the apprenticeship and the temporary contract start.
Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the individual level and
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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Figure 3.A.3: Probability of being in open-ended contracts at initial or other firms
(small firms)
The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for three outcomes: the probability of being
employed under an open-ended contract, the probability of being employed under an open-ended contract
at the same firm where the contract is started (k = 0) and the probability of being employed under an
open-ended contract in firms other than the firm where the contract started. The latter constitutes
the union of the former two events. The difference at event time k = −1 is normalized at zero. Event
time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both the apprenticeship and the temporary contract start.
Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the individual level and
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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Figure 3.A.4: Probability of being in open-ended contracts at initial or other firms (big
firms)
The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for three outcomes: the probability of being
employed under an open-ended contract, the probability of being employed under an open-ended contract
at the same firm where the contract is started (k = 0) and the probability of being employed under an
open-ended contract in firms other than the firm where the contract started. The latter constitutes
the union of the former two events. The difference at event time k = −1 is normalized at zero. Event
time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both the apprenticeship and the temporary contract start.
Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the individual level and
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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Figure 3.A.5: Probability of being in temporary contracts at initial or other firms (small
firms)
The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for three outcomes: the probability of being
employed under a temporary contract, the probability of being employed under a temporary contract
at the same firm where the contract is started (k = 0) and the probability of being employed under
a temporary contract in firms other than the firm where the contract started. The latter constitutes
the union of the former two events. The difference at event time k = −1 is normalized at zero. Event
time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both the apprenticeship and the temporary contract start.
Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the individual level and
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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Figure 3.A.6: Probability of being in open-ended contracts at initial or other firms (big
firms)
The figure plots βTk coefficients from specification 3.1 for three outcomes: the probability of being
employed under a temporary contract, the probability of being employed under a temporary contract
at the same firm where the contract is started (k = 0) and the probability of being employed under
a temporary contract in firms other than the firm where the contract started. The latter constitutes
the union of the former two events. The difference at event time k = −1 is normalized at zero. Event
time k = 0 corresponds to the quarter when both the apprenticeship and the temporary contract start.
Standard errors for the difference-in-differences estimates are clustered at the individual level and
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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